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Abstract
The increasing technical capabilities of mobile phones have resulted in sev-
eral mobile payment (m-payment) methods being proposed. Handsets like
smartphones provide powerful computation capability that allow applications
such as m-payment transactions to become more secure and intuitive to users.
Near Field Communication (NFC) technology has been considered as a po-
tential killer technology that will greatly impact the way mobile devices are
used. NFC is a short range wireless communication interface that allows the
integration of a mobile device into existing contactless infrastructures. It offers
the potential for advanced cryptographic calculations for security protection,
with the convenience of mobile phone usage. Within this thesis, a number of
existing technologies are introduced and used in conjunction with NFC.
NFC enhances a range of applications such as contactless payment, ticketing,
transportation, user identification, and data access. Three different kinds of
m-payment systems are proposed in this thesis, all of which are principally
Mobile Network Operator (MNO) centric rather than based around a con-
ventional Bank Issuer. The research focus is on achieving secure payment
transactions and user authentication within a conventional merchant paymen-
t environment. The proposed solutions exploit different existing technologies
such as Second-Generation wireless telephone technology(2G), Third-
Generation wireless telephone technology (3G), and Citizen Identity
Cards and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) combined with NFC to pro-
vide strong security and ease of use.
An important design goal was to re-use as much as possible of the existing
mobile technology security so that the proposed solutions could be readily
implemented into current Infrastructure, and provide secure, manageable, s-
calable and ubiquitous m-payment services.
This thesis describes the critical technologies and then presents the design and
analysis of the proposed m-payment solutions.
6
Contents
1 Introduction 16
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3 Organisation of Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2 Background: Near Field Communication 23
2.1 NFC: Near Field Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 NFC: Basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3 NFC: Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4 NFC: Mobile Architecture and Secure Element . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4.1 The Secure Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4.2 Single Wire Protocol (SWP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5 NFC: Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.5.1 Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.5.2 Bluetooth pairing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.5.3 NFC with respect to Other Technologies . . . . . . . . . 56
2.6 NFC: Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3 Background: GSM and 3G 61
3.1 Global System for Mobile Communications: GSM . . . . . . . . 62
3.1.1 GSM Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.1.2 GSM Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.1.3 GSM Security Weakness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.2 Third Generation Mobile Communications: 3G . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2.1 3G Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2.1.1 W-CDMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.2.1.2 CDMA-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2.1.3 TD-SCDMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2.2 3G(UMTS) System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.2.3 3G Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.2.3.1 KASUMI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.2.3.2 Authentication and Key Arrangement (AKA)
and MILENAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4 Background: The Citizen Digital Certificate 81
7
CONTENTS
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.2 Public Key Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.2.1 Digital signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2.2 PKI Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2.2.1 X.509 Public Key Certificates . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.3 Citizen Digital Certificate: CDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.4 Government PKI: GPKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5 Overview of Mobile Payment 99
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6 NFC Mobile Payment with GSM Network 106
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6.2 NFC M-PAYMENT SYSTEM BASED ON GSM . . . . . . . . 110
6.2.1 Initial Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.2.2 Price Visual Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.2.3 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.2.4 Transaction Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.3 PROTOCOL ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.3.1 Detailed Risk Scenario Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.3.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Mobile Payment
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.3.2.1 Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.3.2.2 Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7 NFC Mobile Payment with 3G Network 129
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.2 NFC M-PAYMENT SYSTEM BASED ON 3G . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.2.1 Price Visual Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
7.2.2 Mutual Authentication between Entities . . . . . . . . . 142
7.2.3 Transaction Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.3 PROTOCOL ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
7.3.1 Detailed Risk Scenario Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
7.3.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of the 3G Mobile Pay-
ment Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
7.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
8 NFC M-Payment with Citizen Digital Certificate 155
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
8.2 NFC M-PAYMENT SYSTEM WITH CDC . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
8.2.1 Phase 1: Endorsed Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
8.2.2 Phase 2: NFC m-Payment Transaction . . . . . . . . . . 167
8.3 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
8
CONTENTS
8.3.1 Attack Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
8.3.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of the CDC Mobile Pay-
ment Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
8.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
9 Prototype Implementation of
the CDC Scheme 177
9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
9.2 System Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
9.3 Platform and Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
9.4 Nokia 6131 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
9.5 Practical Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
9.5.1 Registration Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
9.5.2 Payment Transaction Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
9.6 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
10 Overall Conclusion 202
10.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
11 Addendum 208
11.1 Additional Information on the 2G Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
11.1.1 Encryption/Decryption and Integrity Checks . . . . . . . 209
11.2 Additional Information on the 3G Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
11.2.1 Encryption/Decryption, Verification and Integrity Check-
ing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
11.2.2 Verification and Integrity Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
11.2.3 CRYP COMMAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
11.3 Additional Information on the CDC Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . 216
Bibliography 217
9
List of Figures
2.1 NFC N-Mark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2 NFC related standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3 NFCIP2 mode selection [6] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4 NFC communication modes [12] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5 NFC tag specifications [12] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.6 Secure element communication in NFC devices . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.7 Different Secure Element (SE) solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.8 Comparison of different SE placement in the phone . . . . . . . 39
2.9 SE in the phone (handset manufacturer - centric) . . . . . . . . 40
2.10 SE on the SIM (MNO-centric) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.11 Various NFC-SD card architectures [16] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.12 A SIM+antenna NFC solution by On Track Innovations (OTI)
[31] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.13 NFC-SD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.14 Pin contacts for the SIM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.15 Three NFC core applications [42] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.16 NFC Bluetooth pairing. [47] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.17 WPAN functionalities list [12][53] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.1 GSM Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2 GSM Authentication and Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3 UMTS Architecture [103] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4 3G generation of authentication data at AuC/HLR [97] . . . . . 77
3.5 3G generation of authentication data at USIM [97] . . . . . . . 78
3.6 3G Authentication and Key Arrangement (AKA) Process . . . . 78
4.1 PKI Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.2 X.509 Certificate [120] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3 A Taiwan MOICA test certificate on a PC display 01 . . . . . . 92
4.4 A Taiwan MOICA test certificate on a PC display 02 . . . . . . 92
5.1 M-payment scope. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6.1 NFC m-payment GSM based scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7.1 NFC m-Payment with 3G Authentication and Encryption . . . 140
10
LIST OF FIGURES
8.1 NFC m-Payment with CDC – Endorsed Registration Phase . . . 161
8.2 Hierarchy of MNO and CDC under the GCA . . . . . . . . . . 162
8.3 NFC m-Payment with CDC – Payment Transaction Phase . . . 167
9.1 Implementation - Registration Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
9.2 Implementation - Payment Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
9.3 Nokia 6131 NFC handset. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
9.4 Nokia 6131 NFC architecture. [167] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
9.5 User action and phone display in registration phase. . . . . . . . 186
9.6 Application home page. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
9.7 Function selection page. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
9.8 Sign SE page. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
9.9 User’s PIN input page. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
9.10 CDC card interact with user’s handset page . . . . . . . . . . . 189
9.11 Save in memory card page. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
9.12 Saving certificate page. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
9.13 Certificate existed exception page. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
9.14 User manual and phone display in payment phase. . . . . . . . . 193
9.15 (a) Application home page. (b) Function selection page. . . . . 193
9.16 (a) Product tags reading page. (b) Product information display
page. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
9.17 User’s PIN input page. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
9.18 (Left): POS phone, ready to interact with the user’s phone for
payment. (Right): User’s phone, ready to check out. . . . . . . . 195
9.19 Interaction between POS phone and user’s phone for payment
transaction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
9.20 (a) POS phone transaction complete page. (b) User’s phone
transaction success page. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
9.21 Certificate Signing Runtime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
9.22 Total execution time of the application display page. . . . . . . 197
9.23 Stats of time span in registration and payment procedures . . . 199
9.24 Statistics of performing RSA1024 Signature x20 . . . . . . . . . 200
9.25 Statistics of performing registration and payment procedures x20200
11
List of Tables
2.1 Basic use cases in relation to different operation modes of NFC
mobile devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2 The pin description for SIM card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3 Further classified NFC applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.1 X.509 certificate attributes [120] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.2 An example of a test Taiwan MOICA certificate . . . . . . . . . 93
5.1 Literatures relate to different wireless technologies . . . . . . . . 101
5.2 M-payment security measures and standards . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.1 ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
7.1 ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
8.1 ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
12
Abbreviations
2G: Second Generation Mobile Communications
3DES: Triple Data Encryption Standard
3G: Third Generation Mobile Communications
3GPP: Third Generation Partnership Project
AES: Advanced Encryption Standard
AuC: Authentication Center
BSC: Base Station Controller
BSS: Base Station Subsystem
BTS: Base Transceiver Station
CDC: Citizen Digital Certificate
CES: Data Encryption Standard
CLF: Contactless Frontend
CS: Circuit-Switched
DoS: Denial of Service
DSRC: Dedicated Short Range communications
DSA: Digital Signature Algorithm
DSS: Digital Signature Standard
ECC: Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECMA: European Computer Manufacturers Association
EDGE: Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution
EIR: Equipment Identity Register
EMV: Europay, MasterCard and VISA
ETSI: European Telecommunications Standards Institute
FDMA: Frequency Division Multiple Access
FIPS PUB: Federal Information Processing Standards Publications
GGSN: Gateway GPRS Support Node
GPKI: Governmental Public Key Infrastructure
GPRS: General Packet Radio Service
GSM: Global System for Mobile Communications
HCI: Host Controller Interface
HLR: Home Location Register
HMAC: Hash Message Authentication Code
IEEE: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IETF: Internet Engineering Task Force
13
IMEI: International Mobile Equipment Identity
IMSI: International Module Subscriber Identity
IrDa: Infrared Data Association
ISO/IEC: International Organization for Standardization
Kc: Ciphering Key
Ki: Individual subscriber authentication Key
LAI: Location Area Identity
LLCP: Logical Link Control Protocol
MD: Message Digest
ME: Mobile Equipment
MNO: Mobile Network Operator
MS: Mobile Station
MSC: Mobile Switching Center
MSISDN: Mobile Station ISDN
MSRN: Mobile Station Roaming Number
NFC: Near Field Communication
NDEF: NFC Data Exchange Format
NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology
NPC: Natural Person Certificate
NSS: Network Switching Subsystem
OMC: Operations and Maintenance Center
OSS: Operation Support Subsystem
OTA: Over The Air
PCB: Printed Circuit Board
PCD: Proximity Coupling Device
PIN: Personal Identity Number
PKI: Public Key Infrastructure
PS: Packet-Switched
RFC: Request for Comments
RSA: Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman public-key cryptography algorithm
RTD: Record Type Definition
SE: Secure Element
SGSN: Serving GPRS Support Nodes
SHA: Secure Hash Algorithm
SIM: Subscriber Identity Module
SMS: Short Messaging Service
SMSC: SMS Switching Centre
SWP: Single Wire Protocol
TDMA: Time Division Multiple Access
UICC: Universal Integrated Circuit Card
vCard: Versitcard
VCD: Vicinity Coupling Device
VLR: Visitor Location Register
14
WEP: Wired Equivalent Privacy
Wi-Fi: Wireless Fidelity, a synonym for wireless local area network (WLAN)
WPA: Wi-Fi Protected Access
WWW: World Wide Web
15
Chapter 1
Introduction
Contents
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3 Organisation of Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
This chapter gives an overview of the thesis. We provide the motivation and
objectives for our research. In this chapter, we also present the overall structure
of the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Over the years many different kinds of wireless technologies have been devel-
oped in response to demands for diverse communication functionalities. One
of the most prevalent areas where wireless technology and application devel-
opment have skyrocketed is in mobile communication systems, where Internet
connectivity and phone “app” have established important roles in our daily
life. Whereas the emphasis on wireless solutions was once on maximising use-
ful range, there is also interest in the localised, shorter-range, Personal Area
16
1.1 Motivation
Network (PAN). PAN technologies include Bluetooth, 802.11(Wi-Fi), ZigBee,
Ultra Wide Band (UWB), and Near Field Communications (NFC). Each has
its own useful characteristics such as data transmission speed, range and power
consumption.
In parallel to the development of wireless communications, the mobile phone
has increasingly become a convenient platform for user services. The diversity
of phone “apps” available for download is enormous, however to enable sig-
nificant commercial services there needs to be a secure m-payments solution.
There is no shortage of candidate solutions although most are proprietary
and unpublished, which is of concern, especially as phone platforms are in
general untrusted. The lack of a common solution, associated standardisa-
tion and commercial infrastructure support, arises in part because proposed
schemes often require too many extensive and complicated changes to exist-
ing systems, platforms and processes. As a result, most legacy m-payment
and money transfer schemes tend to be low-tech, using the most basic ca-
pabilities of mobile phones and without the ability to directly interact with
Point of Sale Terminals (POS) in shops. However we are now beginning to
see m-payment solutions based on more advanced capabilities of smart phones
that have NFC capability. NFC offers customers a more intuitive and natural
“touch-and-pay” experience yet providing attack resistant security protection
via the standardised NFC Secure Element (SE).
17
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There are many implementation options and how to make best use of mo-
bile, Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) and NFC technologies to delivery an
intuitive yet secure mobile payment scheme with respect to different types of
payment methods (e.g. services in conjunction with e-cash and credit/debit
cards) is becoming a fascinating research area.
A number of mobile payment related papers [172][139][140] put most emphasis
on low-value transactions as a means to reduce the security requirements and
necessary protections. Some researchers [161][163][164] have proposed more
ambitious mobile payment architectures involving various entities e.g. mobile
network operators (MNO), banks, service providers (SP) and certificate au-
thorities (CA). However, these solutions can be limited to certain scenarios
and to a closed set of commercial parties, narrowly restricting what you buy,
where you buy it and how you pay for it. Furthermore they are often aimed
at copying an existing payment solution rather than using the full capabilities
of modern mobile devices, which can for example emulate payment cards, act
as multi-media terminal devices and application platforms, have on-line and
off-line communication capability, be location aware, and interrogate RFID
tagged items including user IDs and passports.
The MNO is best placed to make best use of the advanced mobile capabilities,
however there is strong and competing commercial interest from other parties,
notably banks. The trusted entity that has control of the solutions and its se-
18
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curity technology is in a powerful business position. Trusted Services Manager
(TSM) was invented as a means of interfacing of financial institutions.
If the business conflicts are put aside then the MNO could in principle provide
all the functionality and processes of mobile payment, satisfying the role of
bank and TSM. For this to be practical, changes to the existing mobile im-
plementation would need to be minimised, and in particular using the proven
security capabilities of mobile networks. One of the criticisms of a MNO centric
approach is that user registration for a SIM is weak compared to for exam-
ple a bank card or a passport. An MNO has historically been focused on a
communications payment associated with a unique user account rather than
establishing a strong link to the user, and in the UK for example it is possible
for pre-pay mobile customers to remain anonymous. For convenient low value
transactions this anonymity could be attractive to users, however if the MNO
is to be at the heart of future high value and sensitive transactions then an
option is needed that provides stronger linkage with user identity.
1.2 Objectives
This thesis will present a set of secure mobile payment solutions, primarily
for physical shop style purchases, which exploit existing infrastructures, tech-
nologies and security by reusing them for flexible payment, including customer
self-service check-out. This is in contrast to m-payment system proposals that
19
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require multiple complex changes and are not designed to make use of creden-
tials that customers may already have. The set of solutions proposed in this
research supports both GSM and 3G and can be linked to pre-existing citizen
identity schemes, with the Chinese Citizen Digital Certificate (CDC) used as
an example.
The solutions rely on NFC technology and also make use of temporary location
indicators inherent in the mobile networks that can be used to counter potential
fraud and security attacks.
In general, the objectives for the research were to create practical and secure
m-payment solutions by reusing “legacy” security capabilities combined with
NFC technology, location awareness and the customer’s existing and strongly
established identity “credentials”.
1.3 Organisation of Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows.
Background and Literature review: We present background material on
NFC, GSM and 3G(UMTS), Citizen Digital Certificate (CDC), and mo-
bile payment from Chapter 2 to Chapter 5 respectively. These are prereq-
uisites for understanding our proposals for secure infrastructures suited
to NFC-enabled mobile payment schemes. Chapters 2,3,and 4 provide
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necessary knowledge of the technologies used in the proposed schemes.
In Chapter 5, different types of m-payment schemes are discussed.
Binding of NFC with GSM and 3G network: Chapter 6 and 7 present
our proposals for secure m-payment schemes in combination with NFC
technology. In Chapter 6, we begin by explaining the possibility of using
NFC for m-payment application, and indicating advantages from re-using
existing technologies can leverage with combining the new technology, N-
FC. Chapter 7 is the extension work from Chapter 6, the evolution of the
telecommunication network, 3G, inherits merits from the GSM as well as
providing enhanced security features, this also reflects upon our proposed
scheme. An overview of our proposals for both m-payment schemes is
provided. Informal security analyses of the protocols are discussed as
well as their advantages and disadvantages.
Binding of NFC with a PKI-based CDC card: In Chapter 8, a more ad-
vanced m-payment scheme is proposed compared to the previous two
proposed schemes. A better user identity verification by binding the us-
er’s legitimate real world identity, a national ID card, with the user SIM
signature in order to achieve a more secure m-payment service (with P-
KI system). Note that this chapter is rather independent of Chapters 6
and 7, and the reader should be able to understand most of the material
presented in this chapter without reading Chapters 6 and 7. The aim of
Chapter 8 is to make a handset capable of providing a similar legitimacy
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for user identification like the real ID card, this allows the user to prove
themselves without carrying a real ID card while the level of the public
trust is still maintained. Informal security analyses of the protocols are
discussed as well as advantages and disadvantages.
Practical work of the NFC CDC card m-payment scheme: Chapter 9
provides a proof-of-concept of a simplified protocol from Chapter 8, how-
ever the POS terminal is performed/replaced by an NFC handset. Run-
time results and memory usage would be discussed.
Conclusions: In the final chapter of this thesis, Chapter 10, we give conclud-
ing remarks about our proposals in Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9. These include
the problems that we have studied, the importance of these problems,
and a summary of our research findings. We also provide some sugges-
tions for future work related to our proposals.
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Background: Near Field Communi-
cation
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This chapter gives detailed background information about a core technology
used within this thesis. Near Field Communication (NFC) is introduced here,
as it is included in the protocols proposed later in the work.
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2.1 NFC: Near Field Communication
Near Field Communication (NFC) – is a short-range and interactive contactless
signal communication interface.
As mobile phones have become indispensable in our lives, both mobile network
operators and manufactures have added more features on the handset other
than just making phone calls. Based on a short-range wireless connectivity,
NFC is designed for intuitive, simple and safe interaction between electronic
devices. As NFC functionality is embedded in the mobile phone, this makes
many day-to-day tasks more convenient for consumers.
The following line gives an essential description of the main NFC action: “NFC
communication is enabled by bringing two NFC compatible devices within a
few centimeters of one another or for the two devices to literally “touch” one
another.” [1]. NFC provides 3 different operating modes: Card Mode,
RFID Tag Read/Write mode, and Peer to Peer Mode (more detailed
description is shown in Section 2.3). NFC-based devices offer users easy access
to different services without having to carry multiple cards in their wallets.
For instance, a travel card, a contactless credit card or loyalty programs can
be stored in an NFC device. NFC is in the news at the time of writing because
of rumors that Apple will be including the technology in the next release of
the iPhone. Google is including the technology in Android and Samsung has
also included it in some of its handsets.
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2.2 NFC: Basics
NFC is an open-platform technology and standardised as an ISO/IEC standard
by the NFC Forum [2] in 2004. At that time the forum was dominated by
the world leading companies: Nokia, Sony, and Phillips. The NFC Forum
now has more than 200 members including manufacturers, developers, and
financial services institutions today such as NXP, Infineon, Renesas, SONY,
Mastercard, Visa, and JCB.
The NFC Forum is a non-profit industry association, which has the vision of
enabling users to access or pay for content and services in a secure and intuitive
way anywhere, at any time, using any device. Their missions and goals are
defined in [2][12] and reproduced below:
• Developing standards-based specifications that ensure interoperability
among devices and services
• Encouraging the development of products using NFC Forum specifica-
tions
• Educating the market globally about NFC technology
• Ensuring that products claiming NFC capabilities comply with NFC Fo-
rum specifications
• Promoting the NFC Forum N-Mark (shown below)
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NFC N-Mark:
Figure 2.1: NFC N-Mark
NFC Forum has introduced the NFC technology trademark as shown in Fig-
ure 2.1. The goal is to help users identify objects and equipments with which
their NFC-enabled devices can interact. The trademark has a free licence, and
is available to use on smart posters, cards, labels, and device [2]. Allowing
mobile devices to “read” information stored in tags on everyday objects is a
fundamental property of NFC technology, as is the ability to “emulate” con-
ventional contactless smart cards and RFIDs used in a variety of applications
such as the London underground Oyster card or access control systems.
This is possible because NFC offers a short-range, zero-configuration wireless
interface that has evolved from existing contactless identification and inter-
connection technologies,such as Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID), which
allows a reader to send radio waves to a passive electronic tag for identification
and tracking. NFC operates on 13.56MHz frequency, with a communication
range of up to 10cm in active mode and 4cm in passive mode (please
see next paragraph for definition of active and passive modes), it also supports
various data transmission rates including 106Kbps, 212Kbps and 424Kbp-
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s.
An NFC-enabled mobile phone can operate in the typical RFID system power
modes i.e. passive or active. In passive mode it relies on the electromagnetic
field of an“active” RFID/NFC reader device to both power it and to support
communications. In active mode it could act as the RFID reader for accessing
passive RFIDs. Alternatively, there is an active peer-to-peer mode in NFC,
whereby each device acts as a self-powered RFID that is able to generate and
control its own electromagnetic field.
Table 2.1: Basic use cases in relation to different operation modes of NFC
mobile devices
Mobile phone Target: Active Target: Passive
Initiator: Active Peer-to-peer
mode
Reader/Writer
mode
Exchange pictures,
videos and data
Smart posters, con-
tactless tags and s-
mart card reading
applications
Passive Card Emulation
mode
no communication
possible
Payment and trans-
port cards features
in handsets
Table 2.1 shows the correlation of different power states with NFC operation
modes and use cases. A more detailed explanation of communication modes
is described in Section 2.3 and Figure 2.4.
Key Benefits of NFC include:
Intuitive: NFC interactions may be triggered simply by bringing a mobile
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close to another device or RFID.
Versatile: NFC has a wide range of uses and applications for the benefit of
users, industry and government.
Open and standards-based : NFC is defined within international standards
e.g. ISO, ECMA, and ETSI.
Technology-enabling : NFC can also provide fast and simple pairing, such
as required by Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, etc.
Intended to be inherently secure: NFC transmissions are meant to be
short range (up to 10cm), however this is not a property that should be heavily
relied upon as there are known range extension attacks on RFID systems.
Interoperable: NFC is compatible with many existing contactless card and
RFID technologies.
Security-ready : Standardised NFC Secure Element to provide secure fea-
tures and applications.
2.3 NFC: Specifications
In this sub-section we will map NFC functionality to a range of applicable
standards and RFID tag types.
- ISO/IEC 18092, NFCIP-1 and ECMA-340
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As aforementioned, NFC offers an exchange data rate up to 424Kbps, operates
in 13.56MHz, its communication range is up to 10cm in active mode and 4cm
in passive mode, and the response time is less than 0.1 second [14][40]. To
widely promote NFC technology, Sony and Philips developed the key com-
munication interface and protocol called NFCIP-1, which is acknowledged by
ECMA (European Computer Manufacturers Association), ISO/IEC (Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization) and ETSI (European Telecommuni-
cations Standards Institute) and standardised as ECMA-340 [3], ISO/IEC
18092 [4] and ETSI TS 102.190 [5] respectively.
- ISO/IEC 21481, NFCIP-2 and ECMA-352
NFC has a later Interface-Protocol standard called NFCIP-2, also known as
ISO/IEC 21481 and ECMA-352 [6], that specifies a mode switching mech-
anism for NFC-enabled devices to detect and select communication mode.
These modes are covered by three standards: ISO/IEC 18092 (NFCIP-1),
ISO/IEC 14443 [7] and ISO/IEC 15693 [9] (please see Figure 2.2). They
are defined as NFC, Proximity Coupling Device (PCD) and Vicinity Coupling
Device (VCD) communication modes respectively. NFC devices therefore are
compatible with the above three standards as they all have the same working
frequency on 13.56MHz.
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Figure 2.2: NFC related standards
The Stolpan Association (a member of the NFC Forum) stated that [11] “The
NFC Forum, in addition, announced the initial set of four tag formats that all
NFC Forum-compliant devices must support; these are based on ISO 18092,
ISO 14443 Types A and B (the international standards for contactless smart-
cards) and FeliCa [8](derived from the ISO 18092, passive communication
mode, standard)”. Figure 2.3 specifies procedures for NFCIP-2 devices to
select/use NFC, PCD and VCD modes.
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Figure 2.3: NFCIP2 mode selection [6]
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Figure 2.4: NFC communication modes [12]
NFC offers three main Communication Modes for various types of applications:
peer-to-peer mode, card emulation mode, and reader/writer mode. Figure 2.4
shows the NFC Forum technology architecture, in which various RF layer
standards are linked to the different NFC communication modes.
Peer-to-peer mode is standardised in the ISO/IEC 18092 and uses Logical
Link Control Protocol (LLCP) for data exchange between two NFC devices.
For example, you could use an NFC protocol to set-up the parameters for
a Bluetooth or Wi-Fi link to set up parameters, and exchange data such as
virtual business cards or digital photos.
A study of NFC published by Nokia Forum [13] has given a good explanation
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of LLCP — “LLCP provides additional communication capabilities on top of
the NFCIP-1/ ISO 18092. LLCP introduces a two-way link-level connection,
allowing both peers to send and receive data, using the following methods of
data exchange: Connection-oriented transfer, where the data exchanges are
acknowledged. Connectionless transfer, where the data exchanges are unac-
knowledged.”
Reader/writer mode is compliant with the ISO 14443 and FeliCa schemes.
The NFC device is capable of reading NFC Forum mandated tag formats
for NFC-compliant devices. The tag formats include NFC Data Exchange
Format (NDEF) and NFC Record Type Definition (RTD) for smart posters
[17], supporting text and Internet resource reading applications.
NDEF is a lightweight and compact binary format, which can carry URLs and
vCard (Versitcard) and NFC-specific data types. RTD can vary from NFC
Text RTD, NFC URI RTD, NFC Smart Poster RTD, NFC Generic Control
RTD and NFC Signature RTD.[13]
(* vCard [19] is the abbreviation for Versitcard, it is an electronic business
card format for the Internet. vCards are often attached to e-mail messages,
but can be exchanged in other ways, such as via the World Wide Web or
Instant Messaging. They can contain name and address information, phone
numbers, e-mail addresses, URLs, logos, photographs, and audio clips.)
In Card Emulation mode, the NFC device itself acts as an NFC tag, ap-
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pearing to an external reader exactly the same as a traditional contactless
smart card or RFID. This enables contactless payments and e-ticketing [13]
that are compatible with existing infrastructure.
Figure 2.5: NFC tag specifications [12]
The NFC Forum specifies four types of compliant NFC tags (please see Figure
2.5): Types 1 and 2, based on ISO 14443A, have small memory capacity (1
and 2 kilobytes), which means they are low cost and intended for single-use
applications. They operate at relatively low speed (106KB per second), and
are driven by specific command sets. Type 3 is based on FeliCa, and has
larger memory (up to 1MB) and higher transfer speed (212KB per second).
This means it is suitable for more complex applications, but may be more
costly. Type 4 is based on ISO 14443 and specifies memory of up to 64KB,
with transfer speeds of between 106 and 424KB per second, making it suitable
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for multiple applications. For more detailed NFC Forum tag type information
please refer to [13]. Moreover, NFC technology is also compatible with MI-
FARE family tag types, which refers to NFC/RFID tag types developed by
NXP semiconductors. MIFARE family tags are widely used and for example
often deployed as electronic ticket cards in transportation applications. [13]
2.4 NFC: Mobile Architecture and Secure Ele-
ment
An NFC device includes four necessary components: Host/Baseband Con-
troller, NFC chip (modem), Secure Element (SE) and Antenna.
Figure 2.6: Secure element communication in NFC devices
The SE is there for a very specific and important purpose; to safeguard sensitive
data and operations when the NFC phone is emulating contactless smart cards
and RFIDs. For example if the phone was to emulate a bank card or identity
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card it would need to safeguard cryptographic keys and personal data and
resist attack in the same way as a normal bank card or identity card. Note
that it does not have a direct role when using the NFC phone as a reader device
in which case other means are required to secure phone application security.
2.4.1 The Secure Element
NFC technology is intended to be secure and reliable as it offers a special chip
called the “Secure Element (SE)” for that purpose. A Secure Element is typi-
cally a tamper-resistant hardware platform (e.g. specialised chip with secured
operating system etc) for the secure hosting of applications and sensitive data.
It can be considered as an additional security-hardened computer for handling
jobs like storing data credentials (such as cryptographic keys for payment appli-
cations, credit card transaction details, identity verification information etc.),
running sophisticated cryptographic algorithms and being capable of hosting
multiple applications.
The Secure Element has much in common with a smart card chip, and in some
early NFC phones this was the “SmartMX” product from NXP Semiconductors
[20][21]. It is important to note that the standards permit the use of a software
based SE, however, due to the inferior attack/tamper-resistance inherent in
software SEs, this report will only focus on the hardware SE options.
The following are requirements for a hardware SE: [15]
36
2.4 NFC: Mobile Architecture and Secure Element
• High Security Smart Card IC platform (equivalent) required
• Crypto co-processors for fast symmetric and asymmetric crypto algo-
rithm support e.g. Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES), Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EC-
C).
• Strongly tamper/attack resistant design.
• Sufficient non volatile memory for application code and data.
• Compliant to relevant international standards such as EMV96, EMV2000,
EUROPAY CQM, ETSI TS 102 221, 3GPP TS 51.011, GSM 11.1x.
• Global Platform compliant to enable JavaCard operating system opera-
tions.
• Single Wire Protocol (SWP)/ Host Controller Interface (HCI) support
for SIM-centric solutions.
Ever since NFC technology has been invented, mass deployment of mobile
payment solutions has been hampered by the issue of where the SE should be
stored (and indeed who controls it).
There are three proposed system formats for integrating the Secure Element
in the mobile phone [15], as indicated in Figure 2.7:
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1. Embedded in the phone (separate chip on the Printed Circuit Board
(PCB)).
2. Included within the SIM card. Embedded
3. Embedded in the removable flash memory card (microSD card) that can
be inserted in a phone.
Figure 2.7: Different Secure Element (SE) solutions
There are supporters for each type of SE deployment, however it would be
wrong to assume that this is because of security qualities. The different options
could have enormous impact on business advantage and the general interests
of a range of companies including Mobile Network Operators (MNO), phone
manufacturers, operating system providers, search engine companies, content
providers, developers, banks, transport companies and so on. In this report
the focus is not on these business issues, but on the security and practical
aspects that are likely to result in practical and usable systems for consumers
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and providers.
Figure 2.8: Comparison of different SE placement in the phone
Figure 2.8 displays comparisons of the various hardware SE options, which will
now be discussed in more detail.
Option 1: SE embedded in the phone
In this sub-section the option can be considered where a SE chip is pre-installed
onto the phone PCB. This solution was one of the earliest to appear in mobile
phones and to avoid confusion it is worth listing other names that have been
used in the past for this approach:
• NFC-SE
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• eSE (embedded SE)
• NFC-WI (Wired Interface) [10], WI is identical to S2C (SigIn-SigOut-
Connection) [18]
• Basic NFC
• Or, NFC secure IC approach.
Since the SE is mounted into the phone by the handset manufacturer, this
option is sometimes referred to as a “handset manufacturer - centric approach”.
Figure 2.9: SE in the phone (handset manufacturer - centric)
The SE embedded in the phone approach was used on most of the initial trials
with early handsets such as the Nokia6131. As Figure 2.9 shows, the SIM
normally hosted on a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC), has no direct
connection to the SE. Such an architecture may be suited for devices that
do not have SIMs such as PDAs or SIM-less Code Division Multiple Access
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(CDMA) phones [11]. At first glance the approach has some merit as it is easy
to implement, with no extra interface requirements for the UICC, however
there are some disadvantages.
The ownership and management of the SE is not at all clear (which impacts key
storage and management) and there are also concerns about personalisation
and re-personalisation of the SE. If anyone can take ownership of the SE then
it would not have the necessary security properties that are needed. If a single
business entity owns the SE then there could be unnecessary restrictions that
would not be advantageous to application providers and users. If a SE is
eventually personalised (with very sensitive financial and identity credential)
to an end-user, what happens if the phone is lost, replaced or sold to another
user. The ownership issue may also be clouded by equivalent activity with
Trusted Platform Modules (TPM), where it has been decided that the user
owns the embedded security chip (the TPM) and has to “opt-in” to enable its
use.
Based on some of these difficulties (and business interests of MNO) the SIM
based option (described next) has attracted considerable support.
(2). SE embedded on the SIM card
It is also called:
• NFC-SIM or SIM-NFC
• SE-SIM
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• NFC-SWP
• NFC-UICC
• Or, NFC secure UICC approach.
Figure 2.10: SE on the SIM (MNO-centric)
The SIM is the most widespread and successful of any security module deploy-
ment and over 6 billion are in use today (and it is expected the number of
active mobile phones will reach 7.3 billion by 2014). Providing good quality
tamper-resistant SIM chips are used, the SIM is a good candidate to include
SE functionality as it was designed as a security processor, can be personalised
and managed after deployment. These days the SIM (or the UMTS equivalent
USIM) is actually an application hosted on a sophisticated multi-application
UICC platform, however we will use the terms SIM and UICC interchangeably
unless there is a need to highlight the difference.
Figure 2.10 represents a MNO-centric approach. As a UICC typically can
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support several applications (historically it only contains a SIM), the SE func-
tionality can be built into it as well, independently of the mobile phone, and
bound to a user identity for secure and trusted transactions.
Of the various NFC SE, the SIM-SE (which represents a user-centric and/or
MNO-centric approach) seems the most likely to result in a secure solution,
without radically changing existing practices and roles. There are advantages
such as:
• The SE can be securely personalised by the MNO either pre-issue or
remotely.
• Existing and proven remote application management processes and pro-
tocols can be used. Credentials and applications can be downloaded and
managed via the MNO existing Over The Air (OTA) mechanism [23], O-
TA is specified in 3GPP TS 23.048 “Security mechanisms for the (U)SIM
application toolkit” [24].
• For users, there is a portability and control benefit as their important
credentials, such as digital money, digital identity and keys, are saved
in the removable UICC and can be easily transferred from one mobile
device to another.
• The SIM/UICC has a proven track record as a tamper resistant security
device.
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• From the MNO perspective (bias) there is an advantage in retaining
control of the customer relationship.
The main disadvantage is basically the opposite to the last advantage. Not
all parties will be happy for the MNO to be in such a dominant controlling
position and this may drive them towards the alternative solutions.
Whatever the perceived advantages or disadvantages, the SIM based SE will
only work if the handset supports a protocol connection between the SIM and
the NFC functionality; as described in Section 2.4.2.
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(3). SE embedded on a removable flash card (SD card)
This option may also be referred to as:
• NFC-SD
• SD-SE
• Or, micro SD NFC chip approach.
In this architecture, the SD card hosts the applications. A single micro SD
card could in theory be used in many different handsets. Some SD cards so-
lutions would provide NFC functionality for phones that would otherwise not
offer NFC support. There are various options for fitting an NFC-enabled SD
card into a phone:
Figure 2.11: Various NFC-SD card architectures [16]
(1) (Antenna + NFC chip + SE) in SD card.
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(2) Antenna attached directly to SD + (SE + NFC chip) in SD card.
(3) (Antenna + NFC chip) in phone + SE in SD card.
From the four various types of SE-SD card architecture, Type 1 is similar to
existing contactless smart cards or RFIDs. For example a bank could issue SD
cards to customers, which then emulate their contactless bank cards. Types 2
has the antenna attached externally to the SD card, which loses some of the
advantage of independence from the phone NFC capability.
Figure 2.12: A SIM+antenna NFC solution by On Track Innovations (OTI)
[31]
Type 2 has the combination of an NFC chip and antenna with a flash memory
card. Moreover, a particular advantage of the Type 2 layout is that it can
be an interim method to offer NFC features for non-NFC enabled handsets
(this type is of similar concept as the NFC SIM+antenna solution in Figure
2.12), though the range of phones it can work with is limited. Those with a
metallic SD card slot will not work; however, those with a non-metallic are
compatible with the NFC SD card. A similar drawback relates to the handset:
the handset’s back cover cannot be built with metal either. Since the antenna
is tiny, the scanning feature is difficult since the reader has a small sensing
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area.
The long term and mass market viability of this approach is questionable,
however there is currently significant commercial interest, for example, a type
3 like solution has been unveiled by an NFC microSD specialist company,
DeviceFidelity [25], and a RFID writer/reader company, Spring Card Systems
[26]. Together they released a mobile payment platform named Moneto [27]
in 2012, the Moneto’s microSD [28][29] provides the mobile payment solution
that processes through MasterCard’s PayPass system, and works on Android
phones and iPhones [30] ( if a microSD slot is available). This NFC on microSD
product using the MasterCard PayPass may have some strategic more benefit
for the banking industry, as transactions go directly into the banking/EMV
system, without relying on the MNO system for transaction information.
Type 3 shows an embedded SE with NFC-WI connected to the NFC chip and
antenna embedded in the phone. Type 3 is more suitable at the stage when
phones are upgraded to NFC enabled devices. Another example is Giesecke &
Devrient Secure Flash Solutions has announced a trial launched in June 2012
in Taiwan by Cathay United Bank of mobile payment applications running on
microSD cards in full NFC phones. A MasterCard PayPass credit application
and a separate Mifare-based EasyCard e-purse are loaded onto microSDs that
are inserted in a modified version of the HTC Incredible S NFC-enabled hand-
set. The Android phone from Taiwan-based HTC is equipped with an NFC
chip, antenna, and a single-wire protocol (SWP) connection to the microSD
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card slot. [32]
The SWP connection between the NFC chip and microSD card slot is not
yet standardised, but international standards organizations are drafting spec-
ifications to standardize a SWP link for microSDs. By using microSDs as a
secure element, banks can generally bypass mobile operators to introduce NFC
mobile payment on their own. [32]
Figure 2.13 displays a large layout of the likely optimum form for the embedded
SE in SD card approach.
Figure 2.13: NFC-SD
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2.4.2 Single Wire Protocol (SWP)
A connection interface called the Single Wire Protocol (SWP)[155] has been
developed for the NFC-SIM centric solution, running between the UICC (SE
embedded SIM) and an NFC chip (i.e. the Contactless Frontend (CLF) in the
NFC modem) [11][41]. The CLF acts as the master and the UICC acts as
the slave, and both of them should remain compliant with ETSI TS 102 221
“Smart Cards; UICC - Terminal interface, Physical and logical characteristics”
[34]. In terms of the phone architecture, Figure 2.10, shows the SE built in the
SIM is controlled by the NFC chip/modem via SWP. Lower layer protocols
that support the Host Controller Interface (HCI) like the SWP are specified
in TS 102 613 [33]. The SWP requires an extra physical connection with the
mobile phone and Figure 2.14 and Table 2.2 show how this was arrived at.
Figure 2.14: Pin contacts for the SIM
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Table 2.2: The pin description for SIM card
Vcc 5V power supply
RST Signal reset
CLK Clock for timing signal
GND Ground signal
SWIO Single wire protocol input/output (former Vpp - pro-
gramming voltage)
I/O Input/output data
NC Not connected
Table 2.2 shows description of each abbreviation of pin contacts from Figure
2.14.
Since USB [38] was adopted for high speed interface connections, using pin c4
and c8 of the SIM (and C1,C2,C3,C5,C7 are already used by SIM), the SWP
was initially proposed by Gemalto [35][36] using a single wire connection via
pin C6, aka SWIO [33], for the signal input and output [11][37].
2.5 NFC: Applications
This section illustrates some of the applications which are beginning to use
NFC. Four basic application concepts are briefly described to highlight the
versatility of NFC: Touch & Go, Touch & Confirm, Touch & Connect, and
Touch & Explore [40].
Touch & Go:
This type is mainly used for access control, ticketing applications and logistics
management. Users only need to carry a mobile device that saved IDs or ticket
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credentials and hold it close to the corresponding reading devices. In future
mobile phones may have electronic keys to open the doors of your home and
office.
Touch & Confirm:
Applications falling into this category mainly cover the mobile payment mecha-
nisms, where password input is usually required to confirm transaction actions;
however, on occasion, a micro-payment transaction can be processed directly
without user confirmation.
Touch & Connect:
Connect two NFC enabled devices via a peer-to-peer connection, e.g. for down-
loading music, exchanging data between devices.
Touch & Explore:
NFC can also be used for discovering information and the user’s handset can
read data out of a document or a poster. For instance, a handset can read
website addresses from a smart (RFID tag embedded) poster. There is a lot of
interest in this area and for further technical specifications about NFC smart
posters please refer to an NFC Forum report: “Smart Poster Record Type
Definition, Technical Specification” [39].
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Figure 2.15: Three NFC core applications [42]
Three core applications are shown in Figure 2.15 [42][43] corresponding to the
three main NFC operating modes:
• Card Emulation Mode –> Mobile payment transaction.
• Peer-to-Peer Mode –> Data transfer between devices.
• Reader Mode –> Access info on-the-move.
Table 2.3: Further classified NFC applications
Mobile Payment Credit card
Micro payment
Internet m-payment
Identification e-Ticket
Access control
Account Log-in
e-Official Document
Data Exchange Data transfer between NFC de-
vices
Wi-Fi/Bluetooth pairing
Information Collection Smart Poster
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Further examples for the three core applications of Figure 2.15 are listed in
Table 2.3. These applications areas can be further subdivided into paymen-
t/transaction, ticketing, access control, connectivity, information download
and loyalty and coupons [11]. NFC basically supports most of RFID-based
applications as it is compatible to ISO1443, Felica and ISO15693. [6]
2.5.1 Use Cases
Some use cases scenarios are listed below:
• Two NFC cell phones can exchange data by just tapping them or bringing
them close together. (see special case of Bluetooth pairing below).
• An NFC camera device could transfer photos to an NFC equipped com-
puter or TV.
• An NFC equipped computer could transfer data to a mobile device.
• An NFC mobile device could be used to check out and pay at a shop
cash register using a virtual wallet.
• An NFC mobile device may be used to make purchases from vending
machines.
• An NFC mobile device could pay at a parking meter.
• An NFC mobile device could obtain cash from an ATM.
• An NFC mobile device could be used for a range of ticketing applications.
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2.5.2 Bluetooth pairing
Figure 2.16: NFC Bluetooth pairing. [47]
A special use-case is of interest for NFC, and is referred to as Bluetooth pairing.
Bluetooth is a useful means of connecting devices and peripherals without the
need for wires, however there have been security problems associated with
pairing devices so that they can work together.
Fortunately, NFC is based on a communication standard that specifies how
two devices establish a peer to peer network in order to exchange data. NFC-
enabled devices also allow the user to establish a Bluetooth [46][154] connec-
tion without the overhead of entering passkeys (shortcomings in its transport
layer protocol), which greatly enhances the speed of initial set-up of links be-
tween devices. NFC and Bluetooth therefore are complimentary to each other,
Bluetooth offers a medium distance connection capability (from 10m to 100m)
whereas NFC offers improved security and ease of connection. Together, they
support unidirectional wireless pairing for Bluetooth devices such as mice,
keyboards, headphones, car dashboards and push content from your phone to
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your TV. For details of how the NFC to Bluetooth connection handover is
done please refer to the NFC Forum reports “Connection Handover 1.2, Tech-
nical Specification” [48] and “Bluetooth Secure Simple Pairing Using NFC,
Application Document” [49].
Other application areas include: Hands-free connections (e.g. headsets) , desk-
top/Handheld synchronization, gaming, image printing (e.g. between printer
and handset) and image sharing (e.g. between TV and handset). For further
explanations of each application please see [50].
Some real life NFC Bluetooth pairing products are available commercially.
Nokia released an NFC-enabled Bluetooth speaker called Nokia360 in 2011
[51]. Nintendo included NFC into their Wii U controller in 2012 [52]; the Wii
U controller is set to be compatible with both FeliCa for its home audience
and MIFARE for the rest of the world.
55
2.5 NFC: Applications
2.5.3 NFC with respect to Other Technologies
Figure 2.17: WPAN functionalities list [12][53]
This section considers how NFC compares with other Wireless Personal Ac-
cess Network (WPAN) technologies. From Figure 2.17, there are six WPAN
technologies which are frequently used in our daily life. Though some of tech-
nologies may work at the same frequency or have similar data transmission
distance, they are not replacements for each other. For example, Wi-Fi cur-
rently has the fastest data rate; Zigbee aims for a low power consumption and
has a one-to-multi communication network. In [12][53], an NFC Forum pub-
lished article indicates that individual setup times for NFC, RFID, IrDA and
Bluetooth are <0.1ms, <0.1ms, ∼0.5s and ∼6s respectively. The setup time
may be another good reason why NFC and Bluetooth are good partners to
complement each other’s innate limitations as mentioned in Section 2.5.2
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2.6 NFC: Security
NFC technology should provide users with convenient access to a wide range
of services and applications, however security is certainly one of the important
factors which cannot be neglected, especially for mobile payment applications.
For example, NFC handset users can touch and download information from
a smart poster (with an NFC-enabled tag), and then they are able to access
relevant websites by mobile wireless Internet connection to obtain further infor-
mation or to purchase products. Products such as e-tickets can be purchased
by credit card payment type over the internet, and the purchased products are
then available for downloading to the user’s handset after a successful payment
transaction.
Confidential personal information and security credentials (e.g. cryptographic
keys) are critical during mobile payment transactions, so a complete and se-
cure system is required to prevent information and money loss during actions.
Authentication, authorisation, integrity, confidentiality, non-repudiation, and
availability - are fundamental security requirements in many NFC applications.
Common attacks and threats against RFID systems (which will be relevant
to NFC) include eavesdropping, data corruption, data modification,
cloning, phishing, and man-in-the-middle attacks. Although the short
time/range over which communications is possible reduces the possibility of
effective attacks, it does not ensure adequate NFC security. As a result each
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NFC security issue must be addressed to ensure that it is not possible to breach
it.
In the literature, E. Haselsteiner and K. Breitfuss of Philips Semiconductors
[54], provides a good explanation about fundamental security and threats in
NFC. Some major attacks are summarised as follow:
– Eavesdropping:
Though NFC works over a really short distance, as its name “near field” im-
plies, it is not immune from security attacks. Since NFC devices communicate
through “radio frequency waves”, information is sent omnidirectionally in the
air. An attacker can pick up and decode the transmitted signals with an
antenna and radio receiver.
NFC works up to 4cm in passive mode, however, an attacker might use a large
sophisticated antenna to pick up transaction signals at extended range. It is
quite possible for an attacker to retrieve usable signals up to distances of up to
about 1 metre away for passive signals, and about 10m for active mode signals.
Further extension cannot be ruled out, but it becomes “difficult” and provides
diminishing returns for the attacker.
“The only real solution to prevent eavesdropping is to use a secure channel.”
[55][56]. An NFC device that emulates a contactless smartcard will have sim-
ilar eavesdropping risks to the conventional card. The literature [57] presents
discussion of practical eavesdropping and skimming attacks against ISO 14443
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tokens.
– Data Corruption:
This attack can be expressed as a “Denial of Service” (DoS) attack. The
attacker may try to disturb the communications by sending data that blocking
the channel so that the legitimate data is corrupted. For example, the fraudster
could prevent a genuine card transaction feature from working. C. Mulliner
[58] has stated some good points which are “DoS attacks can be used for
destroying the trust between the user and the service provider”. Corruption
may be easily detected, although service disruption will continue if the attacker
is persistent.
– Data Modification:
This kind of attack is when an attacker tries to send a valid-manipulated mes-
sage in the correct format to the receiving phone. One solution is to establish a
secure channel or at least make use of cryptographic integrity checks. [54][55]
– Man-in-the-middle:
The man-in-the-middle attack is when two parties need a connection but there
is a malicious 3rd party in between, intercepting and able to modify messages
as they pass through to the legitimate parties. The 3rd party modifications
must are achieved without the two original parties being aware of them. The
solution to prevent this attack is for the legitimate parties to use a mutual
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authentication protocol. [54][55][56]
– Smart Poster URL Spoofing Attacks:
Tokens and tags that are interactive with NFC phones also can have important
security issue, C. Mulliner [58] has stated malicious smart poster with false
URL (Uniform Resource Locator), in corresponse with a correct title of the
service provider, can mislead users to the wrong URL. A NFC tag is placed
on the smart poster, its content can be read by an NFC-enabled handset. A
low tamper-resistance tags can be spoofed and replaced to the attacker’s URL
address. For example [58],
Title: XYZ V Bank.
https://www.XYXbank.com
URL: http://www.attackersite.com
On most occasions users only check the correctness of the title, not the URL,
therefore, phishing attack can be easily triggered if the browser is misdirected
to the attacker’s website.[58]
60
Chapter 3
Background: GSM and 3G
Contents
3.1 Global System for Mobile Communications: GSM 62
3.1.1 GSM Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.1.2 GSM Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.1.3 GSM Security Weakness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.2 Third Generation Mobile Communications: 3G . 70
3.2.1 3G Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2.1.1 W-CDMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.2.1.2 CDMA-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2.1.3 TD-SCDMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2.2 3G(UMTS) System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.2.3 3G Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.2.3.1 KASUMI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.2.3.2 Authentication and Key Arrangement (A-
KA) and MILENAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
61
3.1 Global System for Mobile Communications: GSM
This chapter gives background information on the mobile technologies used
within this thesis. In particular the Global System for Mobile Communications
(GSM) and Third Generation Mobile Communications (3G) are introduced
here, as they are used within the protocols proposed later in the work. The
focus and depth of description is only intended for understanding of the later
chapters and so for a more detailed review of GSM the reader is referred to
[64]
3.1 Global System for Mobile Communications:
GSM
The Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) is one of the legacy
technologies re-used for the proposed m-payment scheme in Chapter 6. The
inherited security features help to protect sensitive information and function-
ality.
GSM was developed by the Group Special Mobile (GSM), which was founded
in 1982 to develop a European standard for digital voice telephony, and the
associated specifications were standardised by the European Telecommunica-
tion Standards Institute (ETSI). Phase 1 standard was first released in 1990
and the first GSM phone call was made in 1991 on the Radiolinja network in
Finland. GSM was primarily designed as a circuit-switched system for voice
call, however the standards have evolved to include the Short Messaging Ser-
vice (SMS), FAX, data calls and packet data transmission e.g. General Packet
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Radio Service (GPRS) [65]. GSM works flexibly in many spectra because it
is a combination of Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) and Time
Division Multiple Access (TDMA). The FDMA part divides 25 MHz of spec-
trum into 124 carrier frequencies spaced 200 kHz apart. Each 200 kHz channel
is then divided into eight time slots using TDMA procedures. The systems
success is based on each user being able to be synchronized into its frequen-
cy/time slot. GSM operates in the 900MHz and 1.8GHz bands in Europe and
the 1.9GHz and 850MHz bands in the US.[59][64]
3.1.1 GSM Architecture
A GSM network consists of several functional entities that can be grouped into
four broad parts:
Mobile Station(MS), Base Station Subsystem (BSS), Network Switching
Subsystem (NSS) and Operation Support Subsystem (OSS) [60][64].
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Figure 3.1: GSM Architecture
MS :– This consists of the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) and the Mobile
Equipment (ME).
BSS :– This is usually composed of a large number of Base Transceiver Sta-
tions (BTS), connected via a smaller number of Base Station Controllers
(BSC).
NSS :– This includes Mobile Switching Centre (MSC), the Authentication
Centre (AuC), the Home Location Register (HLR), Visitor Location Reg-
isters (VLR) and the Equipment Identity Register (EIR).
OSS :– This represents the Operations and Maintenance Center (OMC).
To summarise, in a GSM system the user’s mobile phone with the plugged in
SIM is called the Mobile Station (MS). A cell is formed by the coverage area
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of a Base Transceiver Station (BTS) which serves the MS in its coverage area.
Several BTS together are controlled by one Base Station Controller (BSC). The
BTS and BSC together form Base Station Subsystem (BSS). The combined
call traffic of the mobile stations in their respective cells is routed through
a switch called the Mobile Switching Center (MSC). Connections originating
or terminating from external telephone (PSTN) are handled by a dedicated
gateway Gateway Mobile Switching Center (GMSC) [64]. Packet data is routed
via Serving GPRS Support Nodes (SGSN) and connected to the Internet (or
other networks) via a Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN). SMS traffic is
also handled differently, being routed via an SMS Switching Centre (SMSC).
In addition to the above entities several databases/servers are used for the
purpose of MS authentication, call control and network management. These
databases include the HLR, VLRs, the AuC, and the EIR.
The HLR holds an entry for each SIM that is permitted to access the MNO’s
network and it keeps track of the mobile’s location with respect to VLRs. A
VLR handles the mobiles within its geographic area of responsibility. It com-
municates with the HLR for the purposes of authenticating mobiles (actually
the SIMs) and advising the HLR of the mobile location. The AuC (which may
actually be implemented within the HLR) typically stores the authentication
credentials of the legitimate users (such as cryptographic keys, PINs IDs etc.)
and computes cryptographic results used for the authentication process. The
users are identified by the International Module Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
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which is stored in the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) of the user.[60][64]
The EIR stores data (e.g. phone serial numbers) about MEs and can be used
to prevent calls from stolen equipment [60][64]. This is feasible because all the
mobile equipments in GSM system should be assigned a unique ID called the
International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI)), a copy of which is stored
in the EIR. Unfortunately the IMEI is not always correctly programmed or
may sometimes be modified by a third party, and so it is not such a strong
identifier as the IMSI.
3.1.2 GSM Security
GSM security is primarily based around authentication of the SIM card associ-
ated with a registered IMSI, in a manner which does not rely on the security of
the ME. The latter point is very important as historically the security attack
resistance of ME devices has been very poor. A by-product of the authen-
tication is the establishment of session keys for the encryption/decryption of
transmission data between the ME and the serving BTS. As authentication is
a fairly regular and localised activity, the location area identity (LAI) gives a
very rough idea of where the SIM was when it authenticated.
The IMSI is the primary subscriber identity within the GSM system and a copy
is stored in the SIM. For privacy/eavesdropping reasons the IMSI is rarely
transmitted, but rather a temporary version (TMSI) is used instead. The
MNO keeps a mapping of IMSI/TMSI to the users normal telephone number
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(MSISDN) so calls can be routed via other networks such as the PSTN.
A brief explanation of the authentication and ciphering in the GSM system will
be given here and for a more detailed explanation please see [153][156][157][71][158].
In GSM the Authentication Centre (AuC) holds the authentication algorithm
(A3) and the cipher key generation algorithm (A8) as well as a copy of all the
subscribers’ International Subscriber Mobile Identities (IMSI) and associated
secret keys (Ki). The SIM of a subscriber contains the same algorithms and
one IMSI/Ki pair. Therefore, given a random challenge (RAND) the AuC
and a particular SIM can both generate an authentication result (SRES) and
a session/cipher key (Kc). Network authentication is normally a test that the
AuC and SIM results are the same and thereafter the cipher key is used for
encryption/decryption via the A5 algorithm that exists in the handset (not
SIM) and in the network. An overview of the GSM security process is shown
in Figure 3.2. [62][64]
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Figure 3.2: GSM Authentication and Encryption
Note that a MS is challenged via the local VLR and not the HLR, so in
practice the VLR obtains authentication triplets (RAND, RES, Kc) from the
HLR/AuC in order to authenticate the SIM. Note that the actual algorithms
A3, A8 are not standardised (only their interface), but of course the AuC and
SIM must use the same algorithms. [60]
3.1.3 GSM Security Weakness
The AuC and SIM in GSM have done a pretty good job of securing the nu-
merous communications networks over many years, however the system does
have some well known security limitations, as discussed below.
Information securiy best practice suggest that two parties in a security proto-
col should mutually authenticate each other, however in GSM only the SIM
is authenticated to the network and not vice versa. This creates a vulnerabil-
ity that may be exploited by a false BTS attack (man-in-the-middle attack)
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[69][70]. Such an attack may be exploited to eavesdrop transmissions, insert
false messages or to seize radio resources.
A related problem is the lack of integrity protection and replay detection for
the authentication challenges. It is sometimes mistakenly reported that the
GSM authentication algorithm (A3) is weak, due to successful attacks on the
algorithm known as COMP128-1 [66]. However ETSI did not standardise an
algorithm and COMP128-1 was just an example, so many networks opted
for their own designs, Whether the network algorithms are better is hard to
tell as it was quite normal to keep them secret rather than adopt publicly
evaluated designs as would be expected nowadays. We do know that the secret
keysize of 128 bits is still acceptable via today’s best practice recommendations.
Ciphering could present more of a problem as Kc is a maximum of only 64
bits [73][63] and the phone based algorithm (A5) has been subject to attacks
[67][68]. The value of such attacks may be questionable as Kc is only a session
key which is changed regularly.
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3.2 Third Generation Mobile Communications: 3G
The ideas developed and presented within this thesis cannot be restricted to
GSM as mobile technology is evolving and GSM exists alongside solutions
known as Third Generation Communications (3G). In fact this wireless t-
elecommunication technology is the basis of one of the proposed NFC mobile
payment systems in Chapter 7, in which the security improvements of 3G
(over GSM), benefit the proposed solution. Brief explanations of 3G, and its
standardisation and security are given in this chapter.
3.2.1 3G Introduction
The market driver for 3G was really to provide a faster and more flexible mobile
communications solution than GSM could offer and it used new bandwidth
allocations and ”spread spectrum” technology called Code Division Multiple
Access (CDMA) to achieve this. CDMA allows many users to occupy the same
time and frequency allocations in a given bandwidth and there are three major
3G systems currently in use: W-CDMA, CDMA-2000, and TD-SCDMA.
W-CDMA: Wideband Code Division Multiple Access
CDMA-2000: Code Division Multiple Access - 2000
TD-SCDMA: Time Division Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access
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3.2.1.1 W-CDMA
The W-CDMA specification has been created in 3GPP (the 3rd Generation
Partnership Project) [75], although some of the original work was completed
by ETSI. Within 3GPP, W-CDMA is called the Universal Terrestrial Radio
Access (UTRA) and there are both Frequency Division Duplex (FDD) and
Time Division Duplex (TDD) modes in 3GPP Technical Specifications 25.101
[76] and 25.102 [77] respectively [78].
W-CDMA was originally designed to support (at least theoretically) a data
rate of up to 2 Mbps. The input signals are digitized and transmitted in
coded, spread-spectrum mode over abroad range of frequencies using 5 MHz-
wide spaced carriers.
In Europe, the European Telecommunications Standard Institute (ETSI) de-
fined W-CDMA as part of the Universal Mobile Telecommunications
System (UMTS) in 1998 [102], which was intended as the compatible suc-
cessor to GSM. This offered an easy upgrade from the GSM systems and
less costs for replacing the infrastructure [79]. In this thesis we focus on the
UMTS/W-CDMA evolution of GSM as our target 3G solution, however the
other solutions are mentioned briefly as compatibility in other major areas
such as China and the USA may be of relevance to future work.
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3.2.1.2 CDMA-2000
CDMA technology transmits streams of bits in channels which are divided
using codes. CDMA-2000 is a code-division multiple access (CDMA) ver-
sion of the IMT-2000 standard developed by the International Telecommu-
nication Union (ITU) based on the evolution of the second-generation (2G)
IS-95, (CDMA-One), standard, which was a regional competitor/alternative
to GSM. The CDMA2000 radio interface has much in common with W-CDMA
and also had a target data rate of up to 2Mbps. However its specification was
developed by a different body i.e. the Third Generation Partnership Project
2 (3GPP2) [82], a partnership consisting of five telecommunications standards
bodies: ARIB1 and TTC2 (Japan), CWTS3 (China), TTA4 (Korea) and TIA5
(USA). [80][81]
3.2.1.3 TD-SCDMA
Time Division Synchronous CDMA (TD-SCDMA) was developed by
the Chinese Academy of Telecommunications Technology (CATT) and Siemen-
s, originally proposed by the China Wireless Telecommunication Standards
group (CWTS), approved by the ITU in May 2000, commercialised in 2009
and is only offered in China [83]. A similar technology was presented to ETSI
1ARIB: Association of Radio Industries and Businesses
2TTC: Telecommunication Technology Committee
3CWTS: China Wireless Telecommunication Standard group
4TTA: Telecommunications Technology Association
5TIA: Telecommunications Industry Association
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as a candidate wireless technology, for UMTS although it was effectively re-
jected in favour of W-CDMA for main stream (FDD) use. However usage in
TDD modes was standardised.
“TD-SCDMA combines an advanced TDMA (Time Domain Multiple Access)
/ TDD (Time Domain Duplex) system with an adaptive CDMA component
operating in a synchronous mode” is quoted from [85].
The word “synchronous” means that uplink signals are synchronized at the
base station receiver, achieved by continuous timing adjustments. Interference
is reduced between users of the same timeslot using different codes, there-
fore increasing system capacity, at the cost of some hardware complexity in
achieving uplink synchronization. [84]
At the technical level, TD-SCDMA transmits uplink traffic (traffic from the
mobile terminal to the base station) and downlink traffic (traffic from the base
station to the terminal) in the same frame in different time slots. That means
that the uplink and downlink spectrum is assigned flexibly, dependent on the
type of information being transmitted. When asymmetrical data like e-mail
and internet are transmitted from the base station, more time slots are used
for downlink than for uplink. A symmetrical split in the uplink and downlink
takes place with symmetrical services like telephony.
In real time applications, such as voice, the system uses Circuit-Switched (C-
S) transmission, whereas non real-time applications, such as email, require
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Packet-Switched (PS) transmission, both CS and PS transmissions provide
data rates up to 2Mbps. [83][85]
3.2.2 3G(UMTS) System Architecture
As the 3G system architcture model for use in this report we will focus on
UMTS which includes the following components:
Base Station (Node B), Radio Network Controller (RNC), Home Location
Register (HLR), Visitor Location Register (VLR), Mobile Services Switching
Centre (MSC), Gateway MSC (GMSC), Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN),
Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN), Authentication Centre (AuC), Mobile
Station (MS), Universal SIM (USIM), Mobile Equipment (ME) [78]. Many of
the nodes sound similar to those in GSM and indeed evolution and compati-
bility with GSM were important considerations for standardisation.
Figure 3.3: UMTS Architecture [103]
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3.2.3 3G Security
In this section we will give a brief description 3G system security and for more
detail treatment please refer to [87][89][74]. In general, 3G authentication
and encryption security follows a similar methodology to GSM, however with
enhanced security properties. This evolutionary approach helps to ensure com-
patibility with GSM in order to ease inter-working and handover, yet ensures
that 3G systems do not suffer from the most significant security weaknesses of
GSM.
There are several potential security weaknesses that have been identified within
GSM networks, such as: Active Attacks, Key Transmission, Limited Encryp-
tion Scope, Channel Hijack, Implicit Data Integrity, Unilateral Authentication,
Weak Encryption Algorithms, Unsecured Terminal, Lawful Interception and
Fraud, Lack of Visibility, and Inflexibility. For further explanation please refer
to [87][88][89][90][91].
In general,the main security improvements of the 3G standards compared to
GSM are: Mutual authentication of SIM and Network. Longer cipher
key (128 bit) [95]. Authentication replay protection.
In providing these improvements a new example authentication algorithm was
developed known as MILENAGE. A very important shift from GSM practices
was that the algorithm was published and subject to open expert review before
it was proposed for use. This means that many networks adopt MILENAGE
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rather than using proprietary algorithms. Another related improvement arises
from the use of the KASUMI algorithn [97][98] for data ciphering (and integrity
protection) instead of the aging GSM A5/1 algorithm.
3.2.3.1 KASUMI
KASUMI is one of 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms, which ap-
plies a 64-bit block with an 128-bit key. The process of KASUMI has eight
rounds of Feistel ciphers. Each round requires 32-bit input corresponding with
32-bit output. KASUMI is not utilised in the proposed system architectures
within this thesis, therefore for detailed explanation please refer to 3GPP T-
S35.202 [98].
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3.2.3.2 Authentication and Key Arrangement (AKA) and MILENAGE
• An overview of the 3G authentication process in AuC is shown in Figure
3.4
Figure 3.4: 3G generation of authentication data at AuC/HLR [97]
• An overview of the 3G authentication process in USIM is shown in Figure
3.5
In this section the Authentication and Key Arrangement (AKA) is given de-
tailed explanation, because AKA has an important role in the proposed system
protocols in chapter 7.
An overview of 3G authentication and key arrangement process is shown in
Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.5: 3G generation of authentication data at USIM [97]
Figure 3.6: 3G Authentication and Key Arrangement (AKA) Process
The 3G system uses a challenge-response authentication mechanism for mutual
authentication, referred to as “Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)”,
during which the user and network authenticate each other. The Authen-
tication Vectors (AV) is similar in concept to the security triplets in the
GSM system [72] in that these can be retrieved early by the VLR (several
can be retrieved at the same time) and they are used in the agreement of the
cipher and integrity keys (CK, IK). Note that CK and IK are temporal so
equivalent to session keys.
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– UMTS uses the following AKA variables and functions [102]:
K = is the long-term 128-bit shared secret key between the USIM and AuC
RAND = random challenge generated by AuC
SQN = sequence number
XRES = f2k(RAND) = Expected user response computed by AuC
CK = f3k(RAND) = Cipher Key
IK = f4k(RAND) = Integrity key
AK = f5k(RAND) = Anonymity Key
AMF = Authentication Management Field
MAC = f1k(SQN ||RAND||AMF ) = Message Authentication Code
AUTN= SQN
⊕
AK||AMF ||MAC = Network Authentication Token
AV = RAND||XRES||CK||IK||AUTN = Authentication Vector
f1 = Message Authentication Function used to calculate Message Authentica-
tion Code (MAC).
f2 = Message Authentication Function used to calculate RES and XRES.
f3 = Key generating function used to compute CK.
f4 = Key generating function used to compute IK.
f5 = Key generating function used to compute AK.
Parameters in AKA process such as K,RAND,CK, IK,AUTN are in 128
bits; RES is usually in between 32-128 bits. Other parameters within AUTN
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like SQN,AMF, andMAC have data block as 48 bits, 16 bits, and 64 bits
respectively.
During the AKA, the mobile phone starts by sending IMSI or TMSI to
the VLR for subscriber identification. From the received IMSI/ TMSI, the
HLR/AuC finds the associated subscriber’s permanent secret key (K). The
AuC generates the appropriate SQN [90], RAND and AMF [94]. All these
three parameters along with K are used with MILENAGE: f1-f5 to generate
the MAC, the XRES, CK, IK and AK for use by the VLR. The VLR sends
RAND and AUTN to the USIM via the ME, which uses them to go through
the same MILENAGE functions to generate XMAC, RES, CK, IK, AK.
The USIM compares both the generated and received MAC to check the valid-
ity of the message sent from the MNO to authenticate the network challenge.
If the MAC is valid then it is checked that the SQN is within the allowed
range, in order to prevent replay attacks. If both checks pass the USIM sends
RES back to the VLR where it is compared with XRES in order to complete
the subscriber authentication. After all the above steps are completed both
the MS and the network have copies of CK and IK so can support ciphering
and integrity protection.
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This chapter provides some basic background information about the Citizen
Digital Certificate (CDC) system and the related technology, including Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI), which is used later on in the thesis in Chapter 8.
The CDC is of interest because it provides a strong binding to user identity, in
contrast to some mobile transactions that are based on a strong binding to an
account or ID, but not necessarily the real and legitimate user.
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4.1 Introduction
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is known for offering good authentication,
authorisation, integrity, privacy and non-repudiation, with practical key man-
agement. The Taiwanese governmental PKI (GPKI) system effectively sup-
ports and provides the Citizen Digital Certificate (CDC) card; equivalent to,
Natural Person Certificate (NPC) card [104]. This is a national card (govern-
ment endorsed) designed for representing the citizen digitally on the Internet
by presenting the citizen’s digital certificate, offering a digital signature signing
feature for transactions with governmental PKI-enabled applications and web-
sites. The system is intended to be secure and efficient to realise a paperless
environment. The background to PKI and CDC are presented in the following
sections.
4.2 Public Key Infrastructure
There are two fundamental categories for encryption algorithms:
• Symmetric algorithm: the same secret-key is used for both encryption
and decryption, e.g the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)
• Asymmetric algorithm: different keys are used for encryption (public
key) and decryption (private key) e.g. Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman
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Signatures (RSA) [105].
Symmetric algorithms are fast simple and widespread, however as the same
secret key is used for encryption and decryption, there is a significant key
distribution problem, especially for systems with many users.
One of the most popular public key cryptographic (or key generation) algo-
rithms is called RSA. RSA stands for Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard
Adleman, who first publicly described it in 1977. The algorithm is based on
the fact that it is extremely difficult to factorise the product of two prime num-
bers. A secret key can be generated by two selected large prime numbers. The
product of the two large prime numbers are used as the public key, moreover,
knowledge of the public key does not allow one to easily derive the associated
private key.
RSA performs the generation of a public/private key pair as follows: [117]
Two large primes, p and q are used to compute their product n =
pq, where n is called the modulus. A number is chosen, e, which is
less than n and relatively prime to (p-1)(q-1), which means e and
(p-1)(q-1) have no common factors except 1. Another number is
chosen, d, such that (ed - 1) is divisible by (p-1)(q-1). This is the
inverse of e and means that ed = 1 mod (p-1)(q-1). The values
e and d are called the public and private exponents, respectively.
The public key is the pair (n, e) and the private key is (d). [117]
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RSA encipherment is performed as follows: [117]
c = me mod n
Where m is the message to be enciphered and c is the resultant
ciphertext. The specific operation performed is the exponentiation
of c = me mod n, where e and n are the public key of the recipient
of the ciphertext. The recovery of the ciphertext by the recipient
occurs as follows:
m = cd mod n
The specific operation performed is the exponentiation of m =
cd mod n, where d and n are the recipients private key. [117]
Distribution of public keys is therefore much easier than for symmetric secret
keys, however the public keys need to be certified so they can be verified as gen-
uine. Although asymmetric algorithms can be used for encryption/decryption
they are often used to provide digital signatures, as described next.
4.2.1 Digital signatures
It is not very practical to carry out a complex cryptographic process on a
large input message or data file and so the first stage in a digital signature
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process is to create a smaller data field with special properties that make it
representative of the original input.
A one-way cryptographic hash function takes an arbitrary length input mes-
sage and produces a fixed-length, pseudo random output called a hash. It
is computationally difficult to find a message that produced that hash (pre-
image resistance), or to find different messages that will generate the same
hash (collision resistance).
Hash functions can be divided into unkeyed and keyed types. In the former case
there is no secret key shared between the communicating parties, and legacy
examples include, theMessage Digest 5 (MD5) and the Secure Hash Algorithm
(SHA-1). An example of a keyed hash is the Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC) [106][107].
For digital signatures we are interested in the unkeyed hash type which com-
putes a fixed output (message digest) size regardless of the size of the input
message/file. The actual message digest size is algorithm dependent. For ex-
ample, Message Digest 5 (MD5) [108][109], SHA-1 [110][111] and SHA-256
[113] produce message digest sizes of 128, 160 and 256 bits respectively.
The sender sends the original message and the message digest together to the
destination, and any changes to the original message will result in a different
message digest.
*Note that MD5 is today considered compromised and SHA-1 is no longer
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recommended for new systems. The SHA-256 algorithm is compliant with
current best-practice guidelines.
Digital signatures are used for authentication and non-repudiation as well as
data integrity checking. By comparing the digital signature with the original
message it should be possible to see that the message has not been changed
and that it has been signed using a particular private key that can be verified
as belonging to the legitimate signatory.
Messages digests (hashed data) alone are useful for integrity checks, but do
not provide all the security features of a digital signature. By using public-key
cryptography and having the message digest signed, we have a signature that
can be verified by the corresponding public key (providing it can be verified
as authentic).
Note that this is a simplistic treatment of digital signatures and the reader
may wish to refer to the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) that specifies a
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) for computing digital signatures. This
was proposed in Federal Information Processing Standards Publications (FIPS
PUB) 186 by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in
August 1991. DSS uses SHA-1 with the standard DSA [115], but the stronger
SHA-2 hash functions are approved for use in the current DSS [112].
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4.2.2 PKI Framework
The purpose of a PKI framework is to enable and support the secured exchange
of data, credentials, and value (such as monetary instruments) in various en-
vironments that are typically insecure, such as the Internet [117]. PKI uses
certificates to bind a user identity to a public key. The certificates are doc-
uments containing the public key and some identification, such as a name of
the user it belongs to, or the domain name in case of a server certificate, and
a digital signature. The signature is made by a trusted third party is known
as a Certificate Authority (CA) that should have done some checking to see
that the claimed user identity is genuine. This way if you trust the CA who
signed the certificate and you verify the certificate you also have trust that
the public key belongs to the user identified in the certificate. Because the
certificate is signed you dont need to have it in advance to be sure it has not
been tampered with, and so you can access it when you need to, for instance
from a key-server or even via an insecure connection with the user that you
wish to communicate with. [116][117][118][119]
A PKI is commonly based on the establishment of the Certification Authority
Hierarchy, this hierarchy system is a chain of trust, consisted of different layers
of CAs. The highest level authority is called the root authority and is at the top
of the PKI pyramid. The root CA needs unquestionable acceptance as there
is no higher authority capable of confirming its certificate, which is therefore
normally self-signed.
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A CA is a trusted entity that issues digital certificates and optionally public-
private key pairs. The role of the CA is linked to that of the Registration
Authority (RA). The RA should operate a rigorous registration process so that
the captured identity information (relied on by the CA) is strongly bound to
the legitimate user. To simplify description we will assumes that the RA duties
are combined with those of the CA.
The main operational functions of the CA are: To verifies the identity of cer-
tificate requestors, to issue signed digital certificates, to maintain a Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) [117]. Please see Figure 4.1 for clear layout of the CA
hierarchy (note “E” stands for Entity in Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: PKI Hierarchy
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4.2.2.1 X.509 Public Key Certificates
In short, a certificate binds an identity to a public key. Digital certificates allow
a message recipient to verify the sender’s signature using the public key in the
sender’s certificate. A digital certificate needs some way to get the public-key of
the correspondent in a trusted manner, either by directly swapping public keys,
or using a trusted 3rd party the CA. The certificate requires authentication
and integrity check before issuing, however it may alter expire or be revoked
and so the certificate validity should be checked before use.
The most widely used format for digital certificates is the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) X.509. A detailed semantic profile of X.509 based public
key certificates can be found in the IETF RFC1 3280 [117]. X.509 certificates
contain several required and optional attributes that enable the identification
of the subject.
Some of the attributes required in an X.509 certificate are listed in Table 4.1
and the layout of general X.509 certificate is shown in Figure 4.2 : [123]
1Request for Comments
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Table 4.1: X.509 certificate attributes [120]
Version number The certificate version
Serial number A unique identifier for the certificate.
Signature algorithm ID The algorithm used to create the digital signature.
Issuer name The name of the certificate issuer.
Validity The period during which the certificate is valid.
(e.g. one year.)
Subject name The name of the subject represented by
the certificate. (e.g. a person, an
organization, or a Web/application server.)
Subject public key information The public key algorithm.
Issuer unique identifier The identifier for the issuer.
Subject unique identifier The identifier for the subject.
Extensions Extensions that can be used to store
additional information.
Such as KeyUsage or AlternativeNames.
Signature: Signed hash The hash of the preceding fields encrypted
of the certificate using the issuer’s private key, which
data results in a digital signature.
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Figure 4.2: X.509 Certificate [120]
An example of a test Taiwan MOICA certificate with a RSA 1024Bits public
key is displayed in Figure 4.34.4. And the complete value description of each
field are listed in Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.3: A Taiwan MOICA test certificate on a PC display 01
Figure 4.4: A Taiwan MOICA test certificate on a PC display 02
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Table 4.2: An example of a test Taiwan MOICA certificate
Version number V3
Serial number 67 09 01 1f 28 f6 74 b2 ea 47 68 1e 23 48 13 50
Signature algorithm sha1RSA
Issuer OU = Test GCA centre, O = Executive Yuan, C = TW
Validity from Wednesday, July 20, 2011 7:52:26 AM
Validity to Saturday, August 20, 2011 7:52:26 AM
Subject name SERIALNUMBER = 3825604083,
CN = Nature person test 01, C = TW
public key RSA (1024Bits)
Authority [1]Authority Info Access
Information Access Method=Certification Authority
Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2)
Access Alternative Name:
URL=http://gtestca.nat.gov.tw/certs/IssuedToThisCA.p7b
[2]Authority Info Access
Access Method=On-line Certificate Status
Protocol (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1)
Alternative Name:
URL=http://gtestca.nat.gov.tw/OCSP/ocsp
Certificate [1]Certificate Policy:
Policies Policy Identifier=2.16.886.101.0.3.0
Extensions Extensions that can be used to store
additional information.
Such as KeyUsage or AlternativeNames.
Authority Key KeyID=4b f6 4a 77 68 d3 94 c4 e3 b5
Identifier 60 dc 0e 1b ef a9 ba 7b f6 53
Subject Key 1f 2a 55 a6 87 85 8e cc 97 70 e8 ba
Identifier ff 15 ef 77 69 c2 10 66
CRL [1]CRL Distribution Point
Distribution Distribution Point Name:
Point Full Name:
URL=http://gtestca.nat.gov.tw/crl/GTestCA/
completedelta.crl
Subject Alternative Name RFC822 Name=test@cht.com.tw
Key Usage Digital Signature (80)
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The Citizen Digital Certificate is a natural person certificate based on Pub-
lic Key Infrastructure (PKI), mainly for assisting the Taiwan government in
solving problems associated with offering electronic services on the Internet.
These problems include the difficulty of verifying online user identity and en-
suring the security of online data transmission. The main purposes for having
this government PKI (GPKI) are offering good government information secu-
rity on the Internet, providing integrity and non-repudiation features on each
transaction, simplifying government administrative processes (physically and
electronically), and upgrading services to be more efficient for both the gov-
ernment agencies and citizens. A CDC card uses RSA 2048 bits key size on a
X.509 Public Key Certificate.
Main functions of the CDC include:
(1) Identification Verification: During any kind of online process when identity
verification is needed, the CDC IC card can be used instead of providing user
name and password.
(2) Encryption: Information is encrypted; the information being transmitted
is protected from the danger of interception and disclosure.
(3) Signature: According to E-Signature law2 [121][122], and with the agree-
2E-Signature Law: Legislation passed in the U.S., Canada, U.K., E.U., Australia, New
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ment of the signer, his/her signature can be transformed into an E-Signature.
When an electronic file is combined with an electronic signature, it is viewed
as a legal document and has the same authority as a paper document with gov-
ernmental seal. Therefore, the original paper document can be legally replaced
by the electronic document.
(4) Electronic Certificate: Paper certificates from different agencies can be
changed into electronic form by using the Citizen Digital Certificate.
Some use cases of CDC include:
• Internet tax return filing
• Health insurance personal data and fine inquiry
• Personal travel restriction inquiry
• Electronic motor vehicle and driver licence information system
• Digital household registration copies
• ID loss reporting
For more detailed explanation please refer to [133][129][136].
Zealand, and most nations around the world establishes the legality of e-signatures. Docu-
ments signed online with legally compliant e-signature software are as valid and binding as
traditional pen-and-paper documents.
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4.4 Government PKI: GPKI
The Government PKI uses the same hierarchy CA structure mentioned in
Section 4.2.2 to build a certificate interoperability mechanism between do-
mestic and international domains, and to offer Electronic signature on ap-
plication documents e.g. Tax application, passport issuance. Several coun-
tries have set up their GPKI such as Japan[127], Taiwan[133][130][131][132],
Switzerland[128], Australia[125], Denmark[126]...etc.
Government Root Certification Authority (GRCA) is a government credentials
management centre and situated at the top of the PKI hierarchy, as govern-
ment agencies must possess the highest level of public confidence [130]. The
GRCA is a trust anchor for GPKI. Other CAs within the GPKI are established
by individual government sectors. They issue certificates to be used in appli-
cations of electronic government in order to provide more convenient Internet
service for citizens and business; this improves governmental administration
efficiency and promotes applications development of electronic commerce. Ac-
cording to the e-Government Program (2001-2004) in Taiwan [131][132], the
GRCA started issuing certificates to designated CAs in 2002 and providing
certification services to government agencies, industry, business organizations,
and citizens. Those subordinate CAs are GCA3, MOICA4, MOEACA5, X-
3Government CA
4Ministry of the Interior CA
5Ministry of Economic Affairs CA
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CA and GTestCA6. For more information about the corresponding CAs please
refer to [130][131][132].
The goals of setting up the GPKI are listed below [133]:
1. Building the foundation for the basic security of a governmental Internet
certification authority.
2. Simplifying government operations, upgrading service levels to be more ef-
ficient and effective for both the government agencies and citizens.
3. Sharing the benefits of the Citizen Digital Certificate plan with industry.
In 2003, the Taiwan Ministry of the Interior (MOI) optimized their adminis-
trative processes and began offering online services to citizens who are above
18 years of age [136]. The new concept was intended to speed up processes,
increase efficiency and provide a higher service level. The CDC card is called
MOICA in Taiwan, which was named by simply adding the two words MOI
and CA together, and it was established by the Ministry of Interior in 2003
[131]. Each MOICA is valid for five years from the time it is used [134]. The
MOI issues certificates to Taiwanese citizens and as of 18/11/2012 “3,088,711”
have been issued [135]. The CDC card (MOICA) is effectively an online identi-
ty card, its benefits include having secure and unique verification of a person’s
identity on the Internet, faster and more efficient administrative processes,
more convenience for the citizens from the 24-hour online service, reduction of
6GPKI applications Test CA
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fraud, and high security for online transactions [136][133].
The CDC card was of interest to the research described in this thesis as it
offered a strong and government backed binding of user identity to on-line
credentials, whereas strong proof of identity is often a weak area for mobile
phone based transaction systems. In Chapter 8 we will describe a protocol that
attempts to combine the best features of the CDC and mobile technologies.
98
Chapter 5
Overview of Mobile Payment
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This chapter provides an overview of related research concerning mobile pay-
ment. It covers technologies, platforms, and protocols described in a variety
of literatures, which have been proposed in order to facilitate mobile payment
services/solutions.
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Ever since mobile phone became widely prevalent, people have been thinking
of how to easily carry out a payment transaction through the mobile handset.
The potential sophistication and practicality of mobile payment has practi-
cally evolved in parallel with the evolution of the mobile telecommunications
networks and devices. The industry has been making efforts to stimulate mo-
bile payment market by basically offering people greater ease and efficiency
during the purchasing process than the traditional payment method, i.e. by
cash. Moreover, the trend tends towards providing contactless credit card pay-
ment functionality and the increasing availability of NFC technology (and the
RFID-SIM) will see this payment method combined with the mobile phone.
This is considered a more convenient approach than just carrying wallet full
of cards, and these days people always remember to bring their mobile phones
with them, whereas wallets and keys may be mislaid.
Figure 5.1: M-payment scope.
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Figure 5.1 provides a general scope of m-payment, which includes three major
divisions such as: parties, scenarios, and routes/platforms.
M-commerce is defined as any transaction with monetary value that is con-
ducted via a mobile telecommunications network [150]. Guo [151], mentions
the importance of different methods, timing and medium for the payment in
the m-payment business. Payment methods differ and can be account-based
or token-based, while the timing of the payment can be made in real-time,
pre-paid or post-paid. For themedium, the payment can be charged to a bank
account, credit card or the phone bill.
Mobile payment has seen rapid growth in recent years, and many papers related
to m-payment have been published. Papers with technological aspects that
use various wireless protocols and technologies as a bearer to carry out the
m-payment include:
Table 5.1: Literatures relate to different wireless technologies
1) General Packet Radio Service [139]
2) Bluetooth [159][141][142]
3) Near-Field Communication [160]
4) Interactive Voice Response (IVR) [146]
5) Short Message Service (SMS) [140][148]
6) Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) [146]
7) Wireless Application Protocol 2.0 (WAP) [161][143][144]
However, most of the aforementioned approaches are designed for online web
payment transaction [166], and have security and ease-of-use restrictions that
limit user acceptance. Other weaknesses relate to Internet connection speed or
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SMS latency, which result in lengthy set-up and transaction times. There is less
literature related to conventional (shop based) payment transaction scenarios
[173][174], which will be the focus for all the proposed schemes in this thesis.
A good comparison of these proposals along with NFC-based solutions can be
found in [166].
Kadhiwal and Zulfiquar have provided an analysis of m-payment security mea-
sures and different standards [137], in which various architectural security lev-
els for m-payment are clearly classified. The levels defined by these authors
are listed in table 5.2:
Table 5.2: M-payment security measures and standards
Platforms/Application STK, Browser, Java, BREW
Services/Protocols voice, WAP, SMS, USSD
Network/Radio Interface GSM, CDMA, TDMA, 3G, GPRS
On Device WPKI/WIM, SIM, Device OS
The important analysis factors usually reported are security strength, trans-
action efficiency, user cases, and scalability. In Massaoth and Bingel’s paper
[162] they discussed different mobile payment services compared with an NFC
based solution. They showed that NFC is a growing trend for mobile payment
solutions, however, there was no focus on the security or how NFC improves
and benefits the overall mobile payment system, and not much practical detail
on the proposed protocol and architecture.
In general there are several factors that are considered as essential for m-
payment to be successful [147][148][149]:
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1. Ease-of-use
2. Security
3. Comprehensiveness
4. Cost
5. Technical acceptability [151]
6. Technical feasibility
7. Efficiency
8. Feeling of safety
9. Cognitive automation [145]
10. Compatibility
11. Scalability
12. Complexity [151]
From a security viewpoint, having a secure transaction environment that in-
cludes the security of mobile devices and the communication network, is essen-
tial in earning the customer’s trust in the service. Most of the existing propos-
als only give high level descriptions of the transaction and business processes
and little detail of the actual security mechanisms or data flows. Previous pa-
pers also do not take into account the possibility of leveraging existing security
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mechanisms from the telecommunication system, e.g. GSM, 3G/UMTS and
PKI.
Zhang [152] has raised an interesting point about the main problem of m-
commerce at present; the insufficient choice of payment methods. In his paper,
he compares the differences between online payments and mobile payments and
concluded that mobile payments should make transactions available anytime
and anywhere, but that it has not yet matured in terms of new technology
and modes. He also commented on the advantages and disadvantages of mo-
bile bankcard payments when compared to the usual mobile billing payment
through the Mobile Network Operator (MNO).
It appears that even though the bankcard has a high security, it still requires
further identity authentication (for significant transactions), which makes the
systems more complex. In terms of contactless card usage for low value pay-
ments, it could be argued that the MNO billing method is more convenient
mobile alternative, as long as the MNO billing system has a suitable business
model and the technology to ensure the security of the transaction. The latter
approach could be secured via the SIM card, however the solution might not be
compatible or practical to use in a traditional shop. In face many m-payment
schemes are not suitable for use within the traditional payment environment,
e.g. transferring funds via SMS is not quick or intuitive enough for making a
payment at a store and both the customer and merchant would need to reveal
their phone number.
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To overcome these problems a payment system is required that integrates the
SIM’s authentication/identity features within the payment system, while stil-
l fitting into traditional purchasing procedures via merchants’ Point-Of-Sale
(POS) terminals, and using the existing telecommunication infrastructure.
Therefore a main goal of this thesis is to try and realise such m-payment
schemes, exploiting the latest secure proximity NFC technology while leverag-
ing and re-using exiting mobile security technologies and solutions.
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This chapter describes a mobile payment system for merchant micropayments,
which can be built on existing GSM and NFC architecture components. Many
mobile payment methods have been proposed, although most are not intend-
ed for a conventional merchant payment environment. Our proposal leverages
the SIM’s authentication and identification capabilities and uses GSM crypto-
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graphic primitives, which simplifies integration into the current mobile infras-
tructure. The use of NFC for short range communication allows for possible
integration with existing Point-of-Sale (POS) equipment and the payment pro-
cess from the customer and merchant perspectives remains unchanged. The
system offers acceptable security for low value payments, customer anonymity
and ubiquitous implementation using available technical components.
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Mobile phones have become indispensable items in our daily life. As wireless
telecommunication and hardware technology become more advanced the mo-
bile phone/handset is evolving into a powerful computing and communication
platform. The handset functionality has increased enormously and not only for
making phone calls, but also for applications like surfing the internet, watching
videos, taking photos, etc. The main benefits of a mobile phone are that it
is a “mobile”, light and small computing platform with reasonable processing
power which makes the handset an attractive alternative to other platforms,
such as desktop or laptop computers.
Near Field Communication (NFC), is a relatively new technology that allows
the handset to emulate both a contactless card and/or a contactless reader.
Its ease of use when conducting short range communication, and compatibility
with existing contactless payment systems are major reasons why it is seen as
a key enabling technology for mobile payment services.
This proposed scheme focuses on combining NFC functionality with GSM sys-
tem components to create a new solution for m-payment. It uses existing
security algorithms from the GSM system to derive dynamic passwords from
signed responses (SRES) [153], which are used to secure transactions between
different entities communicating via NFC.
The random challenge (R) result (SRES) and cipher key (Kc) vary with each
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authentication to the mobile network. The same parameters and algorithm
used in our scheme can be treated as a plug-in service that is easy to integrate
onto the current GSM system. In common with credit card systems, the
ordering information (OI) will not be known by the Mobile Network Operator
(MNO) and the shop will not know the customer’s confidential payment details.
T.S. Fun et al. [163] proposed a symmetric key centric mobile payment system
that was constructed upon the MNO protocols. Pointing out the symmetric
mobile payment system had performance advantages on the limited computa-
tion platform compared to PKI based system. Their symmetric system pro-
posal reduced the communications steps between engaging parties without
compromising the security.
The ideas in [162] and [163] can be extended by reusing GSM’s existing core
cryptographic functionality for authentication and additional encryption key
generation, providing a reasonable level of security yet with less computational
overhead compared to PKI based solutions. To explore this idea further within
this scheme I focus on mobile payment-transactions, although the proposed
concept is also applicable to other applications such as identity authentication
services.
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This section details the design of our proposed mobile payments protocol. The
assumptions and requirements for this symmetric cryptographic approach for a
mobile payments system are first discussed followed by a stepwise explanation
of the payment protocol.
There are number of requirements that must be met for this initial proposed
system to work:
1. All the entities must be under the same MNO, as we rely on the MNO
and the subscriber SIM sharing secret keys.
In principle the shared key could be the one used for GSM authentica-
tion (Ki), although re-using the key for m-commerce would compromise
information security best practice. A better approach would be to have a
new key Ki′ for the m-commerce aspects although the SIM functionality
would remain the same except for the key choice, which could for ex-
ample be indicated by a new authentication command, or an additional
paramter in the existing command. For simplicity of description we will
just refer to a Ki in the following text, as representing Ki or Ki′.
2. Both of the shop POS and customer phone are NFC enabled. The SIM
used must be a new version that has the secure element functionality.
3. The customer has to trust the MNO (sufficiently for the low value trans-
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actions) and follow the SIM should support the existing GSM securi-
ty mechanisms [153][71][158], with possible minor modification for key
choice.
4. we assume that the communication between the Payment Gateway (PG)
and the shop POS is over a secure channel, recalling that the purpose
of this design is to achieve the m-payment in a “physical” store environ-
ment.
The PG [164] here should be part of the MNO system, acting in a sim-
ilar fashion to a VLR, which handles authentication triplets in GSM.
The PG’s job is mainly centered on the related payment and user au-
thentication actions. Note that the random number (R), used in the
m-commerce authentication should be will different to the one for the
GSM authentication, however it will be of the same size and format.
Implementation Assumptions:
• The phone can support custom applications in the form of Java MidLets
• The Midlets have access to a basic Crypto API (we use the phone for,
DES encryption/decryption, DES CBC-MAC and SHA-1 hash)
• The phone can only be temporarily trusted with session keys for encryp-
tion/decryption and integrity checking.
• Existing SIM application crypto functions are used for authentication
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and key generation; the functions can be slightly modified, but no extra
crypto functions added. (We use the SIM for authentication, and key
generation)
• Normal communications should be disabled during a transaction
Our goal is to design a payment system that can reuse existing GSM security
mechanisms and take advantage of the identity/authentication services provide
by the MNO and SIM to build an NFC payment service.
The proposed Symmetric GSM payment data flows and the detailed expla-
nation of the system are shown in Figure 6.1. The proposed system contains
the following five entities: HLR/Billing Centre, VLR, Payment Gateway, Shop
NFC POS and Customer NFC phone/SIM as defined in [151][164]. A list of
variables/entities are provided in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1: ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTATIONS
AuC Authentication Centre
D() Decryption (DES CBC mode)
E() Encryption (DES CBC mode)
H() Hash Function (SHA-1)
HLR Home Location Register
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
Kc GSM data transmission encryption key generated
by algorithm A8, max 64 bits [153][71]
Ki Ki is the 128-bit Individual Subscriber
Authentication Key
Kp Shop Key shared between MNO and Shop
(minimum of 56 bit DES key, but operator specific)
LAI Local Area Identity
MACKc(R) Message Authentication Code, use key Kc
to generate MAC on R. (DES CBC-MAC)
MDS Mobile Digital Signature
MNC Mobile Network Code
MNO Mobile Network Operator
NFC Near Field Communication
OI Ordering Information
P Shop
PI Payment Information
PG Payment Gateway
POS Point of Sale
R RAND, Random Number (128 bits)
(generated to best practices)
S SRES, GSM Signed Response
(32 bits) [153]
SE Secure Element
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
TC Transaction Counter
TMSI Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
TP Total Price
TS Time Stamp
TSN Transaction Number
U User (Customer)
V LR Visitor Location Register
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Figure 6.1: NFC m-payment GSM based scheme
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6.2.1 Initial Setup
There are some prerequisites to meet before entering the main payment pro-
cedures (please look at the “initial state” in Figure 6.1), which are:
Step 0.1: All shops wishing to adopt this m-payment mechanism must register
with the corresponding MNO who offers this service. Each shop will be issued
with a unique shop key, Kp, by the MNO after shop registration, this shared
key would later be used for distributing another secure parameter with the
PG.
Step 0.2: The SIM in the user’s handset must have successfully gone through
the regular GSM registration, activation and authentication processes, and be
ready to receive calls.
Step 0.3: As per the existing GSM system structure, authentication will have
been conducted via a VLR that can retrieve the authentication parameters,
triplets, from AuC/HLR [71].
Step 0.4: The user’s handset should get a TMSI allocated by the local VLR.
6.2.2 Price Visual Checking
The first 4 steps contain the initial goods scanning, the price displaying and
the visual confirmation at both the shop POS and the customer phone.
Steps 1 – 2: At the beginning of the whole process, the shop POS scans bar-
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codes (or RFID tags) from each selected product, calculates the Total Price
(TP ) of this purchase, and generates a receipt. The receipt is also the Order-
ing Information (OI) in which the Receipt Number and the Total Price are
included. The OI is kept by the shop as a record and a proof of transaction if
any dispute happened in the future.
Steps 3 – 4: If the customer agrees with the TP showed on the POS, the cus-
tomer may place the NFC phone onto the shop POS to continue the payment
process. The customer phone gets the receipt number and the total price from
the POS.
6.2.3 Authentication
The triple authentication will be executed after the customer agrees to the
payment information (PI) in step 4 transferred to the NFC phone. This part
encloses processes whereby the backend system, shop POS and the customer
handset authenticate the other two entities to guard the safety of the transac-
tion processes that follow.
Steps 5 – 8: The customer phone returns its current “TMSI” and “LAI” to
the PG via the shop POS. In step 6, as the LAI contains 1-2 digits indicating
the Mobile Network Code (MNC), that the customer claims to be using. After
the PG recognizes the LAI code, it proves that the user is under the same
MNO network as this service (Network correspondence check). The PG then
identifies the corresponding VLR by using LAI, and then sends it the customer
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TMSI. The VLR then attempts to identify the customer from the TMSI.
Steps 9 – 11: If the TMSI is not known to the VLR the transaction is
aborted/declines; step 9.1. Alternatively, if the VLR can identify the cus-
tomer,provides an authentication triplet (R,S,Kc) for this particular customer
to the PG. Note that the VLR may automatically have prestored triplets for
Ki, however if we use a secondary m-commerce key Ki′ then the VLR would
need to request associated triplets from the HLR as part of some new non-
standard functionality.
Since we assume there is a secure channel between PG and the shop POS, the
POS can be treated as transparent in the communication between the PG and
the customer handset. From step 10, the PG initializes a “challenge-response”
authentication protocol by sending R and MACKc(R). As the Kc is generated
from the Ki shared between the MNO and the SIM, the SIM can use its Ki
to generate Kc with the algorithm A8. Hence the new NFC enabled SIM can
use the calculated Kc to recalculate the MAC on the given R, compare this
to the MAC sent in step10 to check the correctness of R.
In addition, by verifying R, we determine that the message content of step 10
was sourced by a legitimate PG of the MNO (although at this stage the SIM
cannot tell if it is a recorded message, replayed by a rogue POS).
Steps 12 – 14.2: The SIM uses Ki and the verified R to go through an
A3 algorithm to calculate a signed response, S, and cipher key, Kc. The Kc
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is used to generate Kc1 (as a secret key between the customer phone and the
shop POS) taking the Least Significant Bits (LSBs) of the output of the SHA-1
hash. The customer phone sends an encrypted R with key S1 to PG.
If the returned S, from step 13, does not match, the PG would return a message
showing authentication failed and the transaction is ended.
Steps 15.1 – 16: If S is correct, this also implies that the SIM has a valid Ki.
and so the subscriber authentication is successfully completed. The PG verifies
the user if successful then continues to step 15.1 and generates Kc1. The PG
sends Kc1 encrypted with the known Kp to the POS; step 15.2. Recall that Kp
was issued to the shop when it first registered with the MNO. Since the POS
can compute Kc1 (step 16.1) using DKp[EKp(Kc1)], both the customer phone
and the POS now have a shared key to setup a secure communications link to
transmit sensitive information. The shop POS sends the Payment Information
(PI) back from the customer phone; step 16.2.
6.2.4 Transaction Execution
After successful authentication, the transaction information can be used into
the process for further transaction checking.
Step 17: After the completion of the user authentication from previous steps
and the TP is sent from step 4, the handset displays the total price, and an
“Enter” button to be pressed after the customer has confirmed and agreed
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with the price.
Step 18: After the Enter button is pressed, a PI is produced by the cus-
tomer’s handset using the information sent from step 4, which results as
PI = (ReceiptNo., TP, TC). A Transaction Counter (TC) is also used here
for the purpose of preventing replay attack, otherwise, a copy of step 19 from
a 3rd party might go through as long as the shop POS found the value of the
total price to be the same as expected. Thus adding a TC here allows the
billing centre to update and check the TC value in its system.
Step 19: The SIM computed a MAC of (PI, S, IMSI) with key KC , which
means the user has approved and agreed the PI. MAC was used to provide
integrity protection so that PI is finalised and cannot be modified by the shop.
The S actually bounds the authentication part (part 2), and the Kc1 bounds
the transaction part (part 3).
The IMSI added here allows the billing centre to identify the subscriber, as it
is a long term ID for identifying the user to debit the charge and deal with
other transaction related information.
For preventing dispute between the customer and the shop. The shop POS
shall receive the message PI,MACKC(PI, S, IMSI) that is encrypted/protected
by the keyKC1 to let it know the Total Price remains unchanged. Furthermore,
only the legitimate Backend System has Kc to verify the inner MAC message
and authenticate the user by checking S and IMSI, and so to process the PI.
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Steps 20 – 21: the shop POS decrypts the message from step 19, gets and
checks the correctness of the ReceiptNo. and TP against the original value
from step 4.1. If not correct then the transaction is aborted.
Steps 22 – 23: The shop POS forwards PI,MACKc(PI, S, IMSI) to the
PG for subsequent payment verification. In step 23, as the PG already knew
S and IMSI, it can uses Kc to verify the MAC (for user authentication)
and PI. The PG hereby confirmed it is still the same user who is using the
service. The transaction is based on the user’s long term MNO-ID; the IMSI,
which is associated to the triplet and TMSI used earlier to authenticate the
user/SIM. Thus the billing centre can have a clear idea of which account should
be charged and by how much.
Step 24.1: If any of the three (PI, S and IMSI) fail verification, a declined
message is sent back to the shop POS and the user handset.
Step 24.2 – 26: In this system the PG is under the same MNO as the
HLR/Billing Centre, to ensure the secure connection for transferring the sen-
sitive data like TMSI and triplets. The PG sends the PI and IMSI to the
billing centre, which can then check the user account(and credit limitation)
associated with the IMSI. A Transaction Counter, TC, is a continuous in-
crement of a series number that increases every time after a payment has been
confirmed. The payment process only starts if the TC check shows a positive
result. A Time Stamp (TS) of the payment is also included in step 26 that is
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important to indicate the specific transaction time for future check and dispute
reference.
Once the user has passed the credit check, the billing centre would initiate the
following payment procedures and update the billing related information. Af-
ter the billing centre has confirmed the payment deduction, it sends a message
with the Transaction Number, TSN , the TS and a MAC of the two with key
KP to the shop POS.
Step 27 – 28: If the shop POS successfully verified the MAC of (TSN, TS),
it then keeps a copy that can be used as a proof when querying the charge in a
dispute, and display the result on the POS. Meanwhile, the customer handset
shall will also display the result, which allows the customer to confirm and feel
more assured with the correctness of the transaction.
6.3 PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
The whole system is basically based on the GSM network and uses its triplets
authentication process [71] as the foundation to produce other keys for use
in the transaction processes. A main goal was to try and use as much legacy
capability as possible (in association with the new NFC capabilities) to provide
a practical solution with an acceptable (rather than high) level of security for
low value transactions, whilst exploiting some temporary identity and rough
location dependence through the TMSI. In this section we give the top-down
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security analysis of the protocol.
6.3.1 Detailed Risk Scenario Descriptions
Here we describe some risk scenarios and analyze (step-by-step) the potential
security vulnerabilities.
Scenario 1: We assume a customer is dishonest, has a modified handset,
and is trying to breach the protocol for personal gain e.g. customer account
impersonation and/or credit modification. Thus all messages sent out from the
customer handset have to be regarded with suspicion and a number of issues
are apparent.
1. Unprotected messages in step 4 and step 5.
In step 4, the attacker may take advantage of the unencrypted message,
ReceiptNo and TP , by manipulating the content to cause a denial of
service attack. Alternatively, an attacker could possibly copy stored
messages from step 4 and 5, e.g. from the previous customer for an
account impersonation, as there are not secret parameters that can be
used for setting up a secure channel.
Normally, each handset on a given network within a specific (but possibly
large) local area is allocated a unique TMSI.
As TMSI is unlikely to be renewed as soon as a transaction is completed,
there is a chance for attackers to intervene and copy the TMSI informa-
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tion. The attacker’s modified handset transmits a copied TMSI, step
6 to step 10 can still be performed without any problem. The attack-
er’s handset does not have the correct Kc, so cannot verify MACKc(R),
but the attacker does not care. However, as long as the core Ki inside
the SIM is not compromised, the genuine S cannot be calculated by the
attacker’s handset, the attacker cannot proceed after step 12.
It should be noted that S is a very weak key as it is a 32-bit field and
so it is advisable for the PG to operate a retry count on TMSI, LAI
combinations to prevent brute-forcing of the matching S.
Only the correct match of the “TMSI, LAI combination” with the avail-
ability of calculating the correct S and Kc can communicate with the
POS successfully at the transaction stage. Therefore, it appears that via
this route, attackers cannot illegally extract money from the system.
2. Skipping authentication.
The financial transaction actually starts at step 16, so an attacker could
try and skip the previous authentication steps. So if the request message
of 16.2 could be faked, the attacker could get the subsequent information
about PI. However, to prevent the whole message from step 16 being
copied and replayed, an encryption with the shared key between the POS
and the handset, EKc1, is used to protect the “PI request”.
It is reasonable to state that customers tend to trust what they can
see and especially when the display is via their own devices, therefore,
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having the handset display (in step 17) re-confirmation of the Total Price
(as in step 4 to 5) is a valuable step for the user. For a similar reason,
displaying the result of the overall transaction is also crucial for customer
trust and confidence.
Scenario 2: In this scenario we assume that the shop owner is dishonest
and has access to a modified POS device, and he is trying to manipulate the
transaction information in order to deceive the backend system or customer
to extract money. Although it is considered that the success of such a shop
owner would be short-lived as the owner has to register with the MNO in order
to join this mobile payment system. If the shop transactions are reported as
suspicious, the shop could be eliminated from the registered list.
1. Unprotected messages in step 4 and step 5.
The merchant would ask the customer to place the phone onto the POS,
and then display the total price on the screen of the customer’s NFC
phone. However, as we cannot trust the merchant or the POS, it is not
guaranteed that the actual price sent to the phone is correct, therefore
we added one more step (4.2) in between step 4 and step 5 in which
displaying the TP on the phone is necessary to inform the customer that
the handset has indeed received the correct price.
If there was no check and transactions with incorrect TP the PG, it could
become overloaded, leading to longer times for legitimate transaction
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processing and potential for Denial of Service. Therefore, to protect
the customer and the PG the extra step of displaying TP and seeking
confirmation from the user is well justified.
2. Most messages need to go through the shop POS, so could be
vulnerable to unauthorized access and/or modification.
The POS does not know key (Kc) used between the backend system and
the customer, thus cannot retrieve the core authentication data, S and
IMSI, from step 19 in order to impersonate the customer phone/SIM.
Similar to a typical credit card POS system, the merchant POS network
has to have a secure channel connection with the backend system. Nor-
mal POS terminals also have to be security certified and protect sensitive
data and functionality from unauthorized access, use and modification.
6.3.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Mobile Pay-
ment System
In this section we weigh up some of the more general advantages and disad-
vantages of our proposed payment system.
6.3.2.1 Advantages
Re-using existing GSM security mechanisms and taking advantage of intuitive
operation and compatibility of NFC with existing payment infrastructure is
at the foundation of our scheme. Therefore, the proposed system can easily
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inherit the same scalability capability as a GSM system, along with the authen-
tication and encryption parameters. This eases the effort of implementation
and integrating the proposed system. The service can also be used anywhere
where GSM and contactless payment infrastructure are available.
The dynamically derived session keys are generated from SRES and Kc that
are found universally in GSM systems. These can be used to ensure authen-
tication of all three parties involved in our protocol, i.e. (1) Steps 5 – 6, (2)
Steps 10 – 11, (3) Steps 12 – 15.1.
Significantly, the shopping list is not revealed to the MNO who then does not
know the items that the customer purchased. The shop does not know the
customer’s long term ID and general purchasing habits, thus supporting good
privacy and anonymity for the customer.
The scheme predominantly uses technical aspects of GSM but executing the
protocol using NFC has a distinct advantage in that the system could feasibly
be deployed using current payment infrastructure, i.e. the protocol can be
run between a mobile phone and POS terminals; albeit with some significant
changes to the terminals. From the customers’ point of view the payment may
be similar to paying with a credit or debit card.
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6.3.2.2 Disadvantages
A major weakness of this scheme is the short length of the SRES and Kc fields
in GSM. Furthermore, customers have to trust the MNO with their involve-
ment in shopping transactions, albeit with some privacy protection. Merchants
must also establish a relationship with the MOs, where more typically they are
used to relationships with banks. The protocol overhead is relatively complex
compared to the m-payment via SMS and WAP, although it has the capability
to fit into the existing merchant/customer relationship and use existing POS
infrastructure.
The appearance of contactless payment POS devices suggest that the NFC
communications will be supported, however the POS terminals would need to
be upgraded to support the proposed protocol.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we proposed a hybrid m-payment scheme that combines the
technological capabilities of GSM and NFC systems. The scheme should be
relatively easy to integrate into existing GSM networks and deployed POS
systems. However, the standard GSM cipher key length is a maximum of 64
bits [158], which is insufficient for providing long term security. The scheme
could be extended to 3G systems that use a longer cipher key length (128 bits)
in order to provide stronger security. Even so, the protocol is not aimed at
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security levels associated with high value credit card transactions. The aim
is to provide reasonable protection for low value transactions in a convenient
way that maximizes benefits from the re-use of legacy systems.
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NFC Mobile Payment with 3G Net-
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The increasing technical capabilities of mobile phones have resulted in improve-
ments (with respect to GSM)in wireless communications (referred to as 3G)
and security, and several m-payment methods have been proposed. M-payment
applications are being developed for both online and in-store purchases. Near
Field Communication (NFC) technology has the potential to greatly impact the
way mobile devices are used. Recall that NFC is a short range wireless commu-
nication interface that allows for the integration of a mobile device in existing
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contactless application infrastructure, such as using a mobile phone to pay at
Point-of-Sale(POS).
It is important to provide a simple method for implementing m-payment sys-
tems that offer both security protection (against anticipated attacks) as well
as ease of use for the customer. We propose a system that combines existing
3G cryptographic primitives and algorithms, the identification and authentica-
tion capabilities of the USIM, with NFC technology to implement a m-payment
system. Such a system could readily be integrated into current 3G infrastruc-
ture and provide a practical solution for scalability and ubiquity in m-payment
services.
Our proposed scheme focuses on a “conventional in-store payment environmen-
t”, with mutual authentication between entities and a subsequent trustworthy
transaction being achieved through 3G and USIM security services.
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7.1 Introduction
Mobile phones, with their ever increasing processing speed and functionality,
can offer sophisticated applications and strong security. User requirements for
a “good” mobile application generally include ease-of-use, processing speed,
practicality and security. Near Field Communication (NFC), a wireless short-
range communication technology, has the potential to satisfy all four of these
requirements. NFC is especially easy to use and allows the handset to activate
applications or initiate transactions through simply being brought into close
proximity with another compliant device.
Standards like GSM and 3G already have mature authentication mechanisms,
so we take advantage of these and the benefits of NFC technology to construct a
new m-payment framework. 3G is prevalent as the leading telecommunication
network technology because of its faster data transmission speed and stronger
security mechanisms, than in GSM. Recall that GSM has a short ciphering
key length (64-bits) [73] and no authentication of the network. In contrast
3G systems use a 128-bit ciphering key[95] in addition to enhanced entity
authentication (MILENAGE: f1− f5) [99][100], data ciphering and integrity
algorithms (KASUMI: f8-f9) [97][98] for stronger security protection.
We proposed an enhanced version of the GSM m-payment solution with NFC
that uses 3G technology in this chapter. This new solution benefits from
the 3G authentication mechanisms and stronger data transmission protection
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between entities while carrying out the payment transactions process.
Both GSM and 3G telecommunication systems use challenge-response authen-
tication and encryption/decryption schemes for user identification and data
confidentiality. Using 3G security mechanisms results in a significant improve-
ment of the GSM system [173]. Notably, the user authentication/identification
and payment information (PI) authentication are significantly changed when
compared to the original GSM scheme.
The new design objectives of the proposed scheme are as follows:
(I) Improve ordering information authentication and integrity checking to pre-
vent data modification.
(II) User PIN verification is required for confirming the price and to proceed
to the subsequent authentication/payment processes; to support higher value
transactions.
(III) The security mechanisms in the GSM scheme are replaced by 3G cryp-
tographic primitives, and a real 3G re-authentication is executed for mutual
authentication between entities.
(IV) Effectively deliver reasonable confidentiality, integrity and freshness pro-
tections of the protocol by “reusing” the cryptographic primitives and func-
tions (i.e. MILENAGE) in the 3G network.
(V) The transaction result is protected when delivered to the customer phone
via the shop POS and is verifiable by the customer phone through the use of
associated secret keys and algorithms, which prevents the POS terminal from
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generating a fraudulent result.
This proposed system is an evolution of the GSM design described in [173],
rather than a completely new one. The scheme leverages from the 3G/UMTS
environment and security mechanisms. A new version of the USIM (SE-SIM
for NFC use) provides a secure environment for data confidentiality (stronger
encryption key length), client authentication and authorisation functionality as
well as mutual authentication between the terminal(POS) and the NFC phone.
In addition, the attributes of NFC wireless technology offer a simple “touch”
human-machine interaction that significantly enhances ease-of-use, technical
acceptability, cognitive automation and incorporates compatibility with ex-
isting RFID/contactless infrastructure. 3G networks are widely used, thus
scalability is achieved, and due to re-use of the 3G functions/mechanisms the
proposed scheme has good compatibility to existing infrastructure.
7.2 NFC M-PAYMENT SYSTEM BASED ON 3G
In this section We describe the design of our proposed mobile payments pro-
tocol. The envisaged application scenario is a customer conducting an m-
payment in a “physical” store environment with the customer’s phone being
authenticated onto a 3G network. Our design goal is an m-payment system
that can reuse/leverage existing 3G security mechanisms and take advantage
of the identity/authentication services provide by the MNO and USIM to build
an NFC m-payment service.
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A detailed explanation of the system and data flows are shown in Figure 7.1.
The proposed system contains the following five entities: AuC/HLR/Billing
Centre, VLR, Payment Gateway (PG), Shop NFC POS and Customer NFC
phone/USIM as defined in [164]. A list of variables/entities are provided in
Table 7.1.
There are number of requirements that must be met for this proposed system
to work:
1. First of all, in this version of the protocol entities must be under the
same MNO, which means both the customer USIM and shop POS have
to register with the MNO.
2. Both the customer phone and the shop POS are NFC enabled.
3. The customer’s phone must be switched on and authenticated to the 3G
network and the customer USIM and the MNO share a secret key, K,
because authentication parameters used later in the process are originally
generated from the user K.
Implementation Assumptions
• The phone can support custom applications in the form of Java MidLets.
• The Midlets have access to a basic Crypto API (we use the phone for
AES block encryption/decryption).
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• The phone can only be temporarily trusted with session keys for encryp-
tion/decryption.
• Existing SIM application crypto functions are used for authentication,
key generation and integrity checks; the functions can be slightly modi-
fied, but no extra crypto functions added (we use the SIM for authenti-
cation, key generation and MAC calculation).
• Normal communications should not be blocked during a transaction
Note that it is not best practice to use a key for multiple purposes and so if
this was considered a problem the USIM and MNO could share another key
K ′, and the key to use would simply be indicated in a command parameter or
via modified commands. For simplicity of explanation we will just refer to K
in the description although this can imply either K or K ′.
Note that in order to satisfy the implementation assumptions it is necessary
to introduce a new SIM command (CRYP) described below. Note that this
command does not introduce any new cryptographic functions, but rather
modifies the input and output of the existing functions, and so represents a
minor modification.
CRYP COMMAND
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Mode Usage: Mode 0x00 used at step 12 and 21 of Fig 7.1; Mode 0x01 used
at step 29.2
The shop POS has a secure access module (SAM) that contains a shop POS
registration/certified key (KCER) shared between the PG and shop POS for
encryption of the session key (i.e. IK1) for use between the shop POS and
customer phone. The user has to trust the MNO and that the secret K is kept
safe.
We assume that a secure channel is available for communications between the
PG and the shop POS and that all parties in the MNO backend system are in
a secure environment. Furthermore, the USIM used must have secure element
functionality to execute all cryptographic calculations, i.e SE-SIM, adhere to
the existing 3G security mechanisms [89], and allow our proposed m-payment
application to utilise the 3G security algorithm as the application security
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mechanisms. Moreover, when a payment transaction is in progress receiving
and making phone calls are not allowed.
The PG [164] should be part of the MNO system, orientated as a sub-VLR.
Its job is finding the correct VLR (step 6), dealing with all communications of
the m-payments application from the shop POS, and lightening the workload
of the VLR by doing most of the payment and user authentication actions as
seen in step 9 of Figure 7.1.
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Table 7.1: ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTATIONS
AK Anonymity Key
AMF Authentication management field
(indicates the algorithm and key in use)
AuC Authentication Centre
AUTN Authentication Token
AV Authentication Vector
B Billing Centre
CK 3G data transmission cipher key generated
by algorithm A8, max 128 bits [72][71]
D() Decryption (AES CBC mode 128 bit key)
DT Date and Time
E() Encryption (AES CBC mode 128 bit key)
f4() Milenage f4 function used for key generation
f1() Milenage f1 function used for MAC calculation
HLR Home Location Register
IK Integrity Key (128 bits)
IK1 A session ciphering key (128 bits) for the shop POS and
customer phone generated from f4(IK,CK)
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
K Permanent secret key (128 bits)
KCER Shop POS certified Key shared
between MNO and Shop (AES 128 bit)
KASUMI f8-f9 Integrity and cipher algorithms in the handset
LAI Local Area Identity
(X)MAC (Expected) Message Authentication Code (64 bits)
MILENAGE f1-f5 Authentication algorithms in USIM
MNO Mobile Network Operator
MP Mobile Payment
NFC Near Field Communication
OI Ordering Information
ON Order Number
P Shop
PI Payment Information
PIREQ Payment Information Request
PIRES Payment Information Response
PG Payment Gateway
POS Point of Sale
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RAND Random Challenge (128 bits)
(X)RES (Expected) Response
SAM Secure Access Module
SE Secure Element
SQN Sequence Number
TC Transaction Counter
TMSI Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
TP Total Price
TS Time Stamp
TSN Transaction Number
U User (Customer)
USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module
V LR Visitor Location Register
139
7.2 NFC M-PAYMENT SYSTEM BASED ON 3G
Figure 7.1: NFC m-Payment with 3G Authentication and Encryption
7.2.1 Price Visual Checking
The first 4 steps involve the initial item scanning, displaying the price and the
visual confirmation at both the shop POS and the customer phone.
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Steps 1 – 2: The shop POS starts with scanning barcodes (or RFID tags)
from each selected product, and calculates the total price of this purchase. The
order number (ON) and the total price (TP ) are kept by the shop as a record
and a proof of transaction if any dispute happens in the future. The customer
needs to enter the m-payment application (midlet) to start using the payment
service. The order information (OI) is comprised of (ON), (TP ) and the OI
date/time (DTOI).
A DTOI is just a record of the payment start time, it is not strictly necessary,
but it is useful to have it as an easily readable reference for distinguishing the
freshness of the OI, since using a formal time stamp require further synchro-
nisation and verification between both sender and receiver. The total price
(TP ) shall be displayed on both of the shop POS and customer phone.
Steps 3 – 4: In these steps the customer visually checks the TP showed on
the POS. The customer may place the NFC phone onto the shop POS if he
agrees with the price. The customer phone displays the TP once more to
ensure the correctness of charge sent to the phone as part of the OI from the
POS. Inputting the PIN verifies ownership of the phone and also confirms the
TP received. The phone displays the PIN verified message before going onto
the next step.
The PIN entry could be skipped for low value purchases, however it is very
easy for general shopping to exceed the payment limits associated with PIN-
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less contactless card transactions.
7.2.2 Mutual Authentication between Entities
The authentications are carried out after the customer agrees to the displayed
TP . This part encloses processes whereby the backend system, the shop POS
and the customer phone authenticate each other to safe guard the transaction
processes that follow. The POS authenticates the customer phone from the
result obtained from the MNO. The customer phone checks that the POS is
genuine from the secret information sent originally from the MNO. The process
is based on the similar steps in the GSM scheme [173]. In our 3G approach
the authentication vector (AV ) is used instead of the triplet (used in the GSM
approach) for generating the temporary secret key shared between the shop
POS and customer phone.
Steps 5 – 8: The TMSI, assigned by the Visitor Location Register (VLR),
is the most appropriate parameter (as K must, and the IMSI should be kept
private) that can temporarily represent the customer at this particular time
before setting up a secure channel between the POS and phone. A restriction of
this scheme is that m-payments can only be executed at the fixed state within
one network sub-area as we need the “TMSI and LAI” to stay unchanged to
check the owner of the “TMSI” for ID authentication.
* An added advantage of using the TMSI is that there is a binding of the
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transaction to location. In step 6, the LAI contains a Location Area Code
(LAC), which means that the MNO can use this location information as a
crude check that the customer is in the shop. The identity of this TMSI user
can be recognised by the VLR, where the associated AV to the customer can
be loaded and distributed for later processes.
Step 9: The VLR knows which customer USIM is involved, thus one subset
of a group of AV s that belongs to this particular customer is delivered to the
PG (note that if K ′ is used, the VLR may need to request alternative AV s
from the HLR/AuC).
Step 9 allows the PG to send an authentication to the customer. Note that
AVMP is used to discriminate the vector from the conventional AV used when
authenticating the phone to the bearer network. We assume that there is a
secure channel between the PG and the shop POS, so the POS can be treat-
ed as transparent in the communications between the PG and the customer
handset/USIM.
Steps 10 – 14: AUTNMP is one of the 3G authentication parameters from
AVMP . In step 10, the PG initiates a “challenge-response” authentication
protocol by sending RAND and AUTNMP .
In the previous GSM scheme MACKc(R) is used for further protection against
R (= RAND) being tampered with. However, the “integrity check” function-
ality is already built into the 3G authentication mechanism, thus we simply
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reuse the whole 3G mechanism without modification. If all the authentication
criteria are satisfied, the customer infers that the shop POS is legitimate as
it is registered and authorised by the same MNO. Once AUTNMP has been
verified by the customer phone/USIM and the PG/MNO knows the customer
USIM from step 14 is genuine. A secret session key can be distributed to the
POS and phone/USIM to set-up a secure channel.
Steps 15 – 19: The session key (IK1)is generated using the MILENAGE f4
algorithm plus the existing secrets, IK and CK. In step 16, IK1 is distributed
to the shop POS, along with the Payment Info request, PIREQ. Note that in
Figure 7.1 it shows IK1 encrypted by the shop registration key (EKCER())
in order to emphasis the key usage. However, (EKCER()) is actually used to
establish the secure channel between the PG and the POS, and so step 16
could have been shown just as “PIREQ, IK1” and the decryption in step 17
would then be unnecessary.
PIREQ is needed here to tell the customer phone that network authentication
has successfully completed. In steps 19/20 the PIREQ can be decrypted via
IK1 and if valid a message can be displayed on the phone, e.g. “payment
scheme connected please wait”. Note that IK1 is used as the POS/phone
session key so that CK is not revealed to the POS and therefore can still be
used for securing network/backoffice communications with the handset.
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7.2.3 Transaction Execution
After successful authentication, the transaction information can be used for
further transaction checking.
Steps 20 – 21: PI is produced in the customer phone using OI, TMSI,
transaction counter TC and time stamp TS, as PI = (TMSI,OI, TC, TS1).
Both TS and TC are used to prevent replay attacks and ensure freshness of
the transaction. The TS1 field help the MNO/Billing Centre to make sure the
received transaction messages and related logs are valid and happened in the
expected duration.
The payment information response (PIRES = [EIK1(PI), f1(IK, PI)]) is sent
back to the shop POS, which transfers the requested payment information
back to the MNO. IK1 is used to encrypt PI while a different key IK is used
with the MILENAGE: f1 function to ensure the integrity of PI. The integrity
check prevents PI from malicious modification. As only the MNO and the
customer phone/USIM know IK, the MNO is able to verify the validity of
f1(IK, PI).
Please note that the f1 function accepts a 128-bit input block size (K &
RAND in the original 3G system), thus the input PI is constrained to 128
bits. Therefore the field size are specified as: TMSI: 32-bits, TC: 10-bits,
TS1: 10-bits; OI = (ON, TP,DTOI), ON : 10-bits, TP : 10-bits (e.g. max
1,023 pounds per transaction), DT : 56-bits (sec/min/hr/day/month/year).
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Steps 22 – 23: The POS can recover PI after decryption with IK. If the
received OI/TP is different to the original from step 2, the POS has the right
to stop this transaction; otherwise, the POS forwards PIRES to the backend
system for further transaction authentication and verification.
Step 24: The first MNO entity that receives PIRES is the PG. The PG acts as
the entry to the MNO for purpose of the m-payment scheme, collects/verifies
PI and the customer identification information, TMSI; and for TMSI that
is still equivalent to the USIM which requested this service in steps 5 & 6.
The PG is used to provide similar checks as in step 22, but is also able to
check the integrity of, PI (due to knowledge of IK), as well as the correctness
of the TMSI. In this mobile system it is crucial to have the PG under the
same MNO with the HLR/Billing Centre, to ensure the safe connection for
transferring sensitive data like PIRES [173].
Steps 25 – 26: Here the PG sends PI to the billing centre, and not the
AuC/HLR. The billing centre first checks if the TC is synchronized with the
user record associated with the TMSI and then checks the account/credit
limitation. The Transaction Counter (TC) is incremented every time a pay-
ment is confirmed. The payment process only starts if the TC check shows a
positive result[173].
Steps 27 – 28: If the credit check of the customer is valid, the TC would
be incremented by one. The Transaction Number, TSN , includes information
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of the transaction result and any other information that the MNO wants to
enclose [173]. The TSN is integrity protected using the MILENAGE function
f1(K, TSN
⊕
TS2).
The 3G authentication key, K (or K’), is the only relevant long-term shared
secret between the home MNO and USIM, which means only these two entities
can verify “f1(K, TSN
⊕
TS2)”. It is crucial to deliver the correct transaction
back to the customer to prevent an untrustworthy shop from tampering with
the TSN .
In step 27.2 an “exclusive or” is used to mix TSN and TS2 and compress
the data to fit into the field size in order to satisfy the key size limitation
(maximum 128 bits) of the MILENAGE: f1 function. The size and format of
the TSN and the method of TS2 combination and filed size mapping can be
MNO decisions..
Steps 29 – 30: In step 29.1, the paper receipt should contain at least OI,
TSN and TS2. In step 29.2, (TSN, TS2) are encrypted under IK1 to avoid
modification by an attacker. In step 30, the customer phone can retrieve
(TSN, TS2) and also verify the integrity of the TSN passed from the shop
POS, which can be helpful if a merchant/customer dispute occurs. Finally,
displaying the transaction result on the phone gives the customer confidence
in the correctness of the transaction [173].
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7.3 PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
7.3.1 Detailed Risk Scenario Descriptions
Risk scenarios are concerned with the physical merchant POS and customer
phone/USIM in a payment token environment. A selection of potential secu-
rity vulnerabilities are discussed in this section.
Scenario 1:
An untrustworthy customer with a modified handset is trying to get illegal ben-
efits from potential loopholes in our proposed system, e.g. customer account
impersonation or credit modification. Messages received and sent must have
strong security protection, otherwise confidential price and personal informa-
tion may be stolen/modified by a malicious 3rd party or fraudulent customer.
1. Unprotected messages in step 5.
As mentioned in [173] a TMSI is unlikely to get renewed as soon as the
transaction is completed, so it could be possible for attackers to copy
the TMSI information. An attacker using a forged handset can bypass
the PIN entry protection step (step 4.2) and continue the processes until
step 10 (receive RAND & AUTNMP ).
However, the forged handset can not authenticate the received informa-
tion and generate the correct RES to send to the MNO in order to prove
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that the response came from the real subscriber’s handset. As long as
the permanent secret key between the MNO and the customer USIM is
not compromised, the customer identity can be kept safe without being
cloned and/or re-used fraudulently.
2. Replayed messages of step 21.
Here it is assumed that the attacker bypasses the authentication section,
and attempts to exploit the subsequent transaction stages. In step 21,
PI is encrypted with the key IK1 for confidentiality, and IK is used
with f1 to provide integrity protection and prevent modification attacks.
Ensuring freshness is required to prevent replay attacks. Thus in order to
ensure the uniqueness of each message, the transaction counter value TC,
that is included in PI, is incremented after each successful transaction
and synchronised with the MNO.
Note that IK is changed after each transaction. Only the genuine USIM
is able to generate the correct IK and f1(IK, PI) in step 21 for authen-
tication by the MNO. The protocol design also prevents the situation
when the merchant is untrustworthy and using a modified/forged POS.
Scenario 2:
A dishonest merchant with a modified POS tries to manipulate the transaction
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information in order to deceive the backend system (e.g. ask for fake/gratuitous
payments from the MNO with no item sold), or to deceive the customer (e.g.
charge the customer a larger amount) to fraudulently extract money. This
scenario must be considered in the design of the system even though our pro-
posed architecture requires merchants to register with the MNO, which means
that any merchants acting fraudulently should be swiftly disqualified from the
registered list [173].
1. Unprotected messages in step 5.
An unprotected TMSI and LAI can be obtained and stored fairly easily.
However, this information is temporary and the customer’s identification
may change when the customer handset moves to a different 3G network
cell/local area. On the other hand, if the customer is still shopping
within the same area then further security mechanisms are required.
The protocol makes use of the 3G authentication mechanism to pre-
vent the customer identity being spoofed. This means that despite the
TMSI remaining unchanged over a shopping area or period of time spent
shopping, a forged POS cannot impersonate customer’s identity to the
backend system.
2. Displaying the payment result to the customer.
The transaction result has to be known to both the shop POS and cus-
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tomer phone. For example, the merchant could deny the successful pay-
ment transaction and not give the purchased item to the customer, when
the payment actually completed and debited the customer’s account.
The protocol provides that the message can be read by the Shop POS as
well as delivering the genuine result to the customer phone, taking into
account that all MNO messages are returned to the phone via the shop
POS.
The function f1(K, TSN
⊕
TS2) in step 27.2 works as a keyed hash
function that provide integrity protection. This prevents transmitted
information, TSN
⊕
TS2, being modified by a dishonest shop POS. Al-
ternatively, the payment result can be sent via SMS direct to the phone,
but a drawback is that the SMS process requires additional overhead and
could add to the total transaction time and cost.
7.3.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of the 3G Mobile Pay-
ment Scheme
Advantages: The benefits of the proposed protocol/system are listed below.
1. The protocol reuses the existing and well proven secure algorithm/functionality
of the 3G network and the availability of a long-term shared secret key
between the MNO and USIM. This reduces the technical changes that
are to be implemented and requires less integration effort within deployed
3G systems.
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2. The proposed system offers broad scalability, ease of use as well as good
user authentication/identification and data confidentiality. The service
can be used anywhere where 3G and contactless payment infrastructure
are available. The MNO gets the advantage of being involved in pay-
ment transactions as well as collecting customer location and transaction
records for business strategy purposes.
3. From a privacy perspective, no more information is disclosed than for
normal credit/debit card transactions.
4. The mutual authentication mechanism of 3G, AKA, is used by the M-
NO, shop POS, and customer phone to authenticate each other (steps
5 – 14). The customer’s shopping list is not revealed to the MNO, and
the customer’s long term ID and personal MNO associated payment in-
formation cannot be retrieved at the shop POS, thus good privacy and
reasonable anonymity are provided to the customer.
Disadvantages: As well as the advantages mentioned above, there are also
weaknesses that need further discussion.
1. A major drawback is that due to the utilization of the TMSI for initial
user identification the system is restricted if used in a changing TMSI
environment like a moving vehicle, e.g. trains.
2. The whole m-payment process is online and reliant on communication
152
7.4 Conclusion
connections, while some merchants would prefer an off-line payment
method as this increases speed of the transaction and minimises the
merchant’s data cost.
3. In the description of step 20, a bit-breakdown is suggested for PI. A
problem may occur if the input data, in step 21, to the f1 function is
larger than the maximum size of 128-bits. Possible solutions are either to
perform a hash function before f1 for each of the sub PI parameters or to
use ExclusiveOR(XOR), thereby maintaining simplicity and efficiency
while adhering to the maximum input data length.
4. 3G re-authentication is performed in the mutual authentication section
and so if we use the key K without some functional changes in the phone
we risk the phone’s radio cipher and integrity keys, thus the m-payment
could disrupt normal communications. Furthermore, and as mentioned
previously, it is not a good idea to use a key for more than one purpose
and so it may be better to use a second K ′, shared between the MNO
and the USIM although this would require some additional functional
changes in the phone/USIM and back office.
7.4 Conclusion
The core of this scheme is based on a simple challenge-response authentication
process that reuses the 3G security functions and parameters to provide a prac-
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tical NFC m-payment system. Unlike in the previously proposed GSM-based
schemes, where repeated hash functions are used for generating new cipher and
integrity keys, the 3G scheme uses existing keys. The authentication process
is shortened and less effort is needed for generating new cryptographic keys
for ciphering and protection compared to the GSM based scheme. The secu-
rity of the entire system is strengthened by the enhanced 3G authentications
mechanisms. Future investigations include off-line transactions and self-service
check-out.
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In this chapter a Citizen Digital Certificate (CDC) m-payment scheme in con-
junction with NFC is proposed. Detailed system architectures, protocols, steps
and analysis are given to show the feasibility of this scheme.
With the increasing availability of smart handsets, the mobile phone is likely to
become the device of choice for accessing sophisticated services and applications
in a convenient yet secure manner. This is especially true with the introduc-
tion of Near Field Communication (NFC), which provides the phone with an
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interface allowing it to act as a smart card reader or to emulate smart cards.
However the user registration process is relatively weak for access to mobile
communication services and some third party application providers have con-
cerns when security certification is totally reliant on the trust and processes of
the mobile network operator. In contrast, the Citizen Digital Certificate (CDC)
is a PKI based citizen identification card issued to a user by the government,
following a rigorous user registration process. In our investigation we explore
the combined use of NFC phones and the CDC card, by using the government
card to endorse the security of credentials held within the NFC Security Ele-
ment that is hosted within the phone’s Subscriber Identity Module (SIM). In
this chapter, we propose and describe a secure mobile payment system solution
for use in a traditional in-store environment, which combines the CDC PKI,
the NFC secure element within the SIM and a 3G mobile network. Moreover,
the solution provides a convenient user experience, which leverages from the
wide-scale 3G network and the short-range contactless communication of NFC,
and could replace the use of payment or service specific smart cards.
8.1 Introduction
A very common way of allowing users to make non-cash payments is to is-
sue them with a smart card. The number of issued physical cards has been
steadily increasing in recent years and many people have multiple debit, credit
and transport cards. To address this, some bank cards are already issuing
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multi-purpose cards, e.g. the Oyster card and payWave variant of credit cards
issued by Barclay in the UK. Combining banking and transport functionality
in a secure manner has some notable advantages, e.g. a user can have the e-
cash functionality of a transport card and use the bank credentials for top-up
whenever the credit runs low. [165]
The above example serves to illustrate that an alternative to simply issu-
ing more and more smart cards is desirable and that a solution may benefit
from combination of multiple technologies and legacy systems. In this chap-
ter the combination of the multiple technologies: Near Field Communication
(NFC), Secure Element-SIM (SE-SIM) and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI),
are used with mobile communication and CDC legacy systems to construct an
m-payment system.
NFC in addition with SE-SIM provides strong cryptographic calculation pow-
er and proximity communication between compatible devices. It offers good
security, yet an easy intuitive user experience and ubiquitous mobile access to
users’ payment accounts and credit. The functionality may also be securely
managed via the mature and well standardised telecommunication infrastruc-
ture of the mobile network operator (MNO). PKI, apart from its slow speed
of calculation on limited resource devices, offers strong security and verifiable
digital signatures without the key distribution problems of symmetric solu-
tions. How to combine the best features of these existing technologies (and
associated legacy systems) and construct a secure and easy to use in-store
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payment system, is the main goal of this work.
Two phases are defined in the proposed payment transaction; the user regis-
tration (endorsed registration) phase and the actual payment execution phase.
Registration is only performed once and relies on a prior trust relationship of
both the MNO and the user with a third party Certification Authority (CA).
In particular, the CA is the government entity that issued the user’s CDC
card. The MNO trust relationship with the CA permits a mobile enabled
transaction to be associated with the strong user identity registration of the
CDC card. Note that some changes to CDC functionality would be required
to adopt this solution, although they are well within the capabilities of the
CDC card devices.
8.2 NFC M-PAYMENT SYSTEM WITH CDC
We assume that a customer wishes to perform a mobile payment transaction
while shopping within a conventional in-store environment (with a fixed line
POS) and that the customer is already registered for CDC i.e. CDC is a
government issued certificate that works as a digital ID card. The uniqueness
of the CDC card, the private-key and public-key secure functionality, and the
nation-wide acceptance and validation are complimentary features for NFC
phone (SE-SIM) enabled mobile payment services. Please note that all phone-
based cryptographic calculations and confidential data in the proposed solution
are carried out and stored in the SE-SIM.
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In this section, a step-by-step description is given of the combined CDC and
NFC mobile payment system solution. The m-payment transaction service is
separated into two phases: Endorsed Registration phase and thePayment
Transaction phase. Assumptions and requirements are presented before
each phase description. All the notations and abbreviations used within the
descriptions are provided in Table 8.1.
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Table 8.1: ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTATIONS
AuC Authentication Centre
CDC Citizen Digital Certificate
Cer Certificate (X.509)
D() Decryption (RSA 2048 bits)
DT Date and Time
E() Encryption (RSA 2048 bits)
EC Endorsed Credential
ED Expiry Date
GEN Self Key Generation Command from MNO
GCA Government Certificate Authority
ID Identity/serial number of the smart card
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
KAPP Application Key between SE-SIM and CDC
MAC Message Authentication Code
MNO Mobile Network Operator
MP Mobile Payment
MSISDN Mobile Subscriber ISDN Number (phone number)
MSK Shared key between MNO and SE-SIM (AES 128 bits)
NFC Near Field Communication
OI Ordering Information
ON Ordering Number
PI Payment Information
PIREQ Payment Information Request
PK Public Key
POS Point of Sale
PR Payment Result
R Random Number
SE Secure Element
SigA(B) Signature of B which is signed by key A
SK Private Key
SN Serial Number
TC Transaction Counter
TL Transaction Limit
TMSI Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
TP Total Price
TN Transaction Number
USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module
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8.2.1 Phase 1: Endorsed Registration
Figure 8.1: NFC m-Payment with CDC – Endorsed Registration Phase
Endorsed registration is the process of binding the mobile transactional creden-
tials with customer credentials certified by a trusted third party. As Figure 8.1
depicts, three entities are used in this phase: MNO/AuC, the customer’s
NFC phone/SE-SIM and the customer’s ID card, e.g. CDC.
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Here we use CDC as an example in the system and assume both MNO and
customer’s CDC are under the same CA, i.e. the Government CA (GCA).
Please see Figure 8.2.
Figure 8.2: Hierarchy of MNO and CDC under the GCA
The GCA (which represents the trusted third party) is used to verify the
customer’s CDC, so that it can be used to endorse the customer’s SE-SIM.
The MNO works as a domain entity to verify the mobile user’s phone and
associated CDC. Because it recognises the GCA it can check the authenticity
of the CDC provided by the customer and verify the Endorsed Credential
(EC) to generate a certificate for the SE-SIM (CerSE) for later use in mobile
payment transactions.
The customer NFC phone is a bridge for the MNO to authenticate the CDC
ID card and prove that transaction information is backed by the CDC. The
main job of the CDC here is to generate the EC as a valid endorsement for
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the customer phone when performing subsequent m-payment transactions.
Some additional assumptions are necessary:
(1) The MNO has already cooperated with the GCA, which means the CDC
card would contain the public key of the MNO (PKMNO) when it is issued to
the user.
(2) The MNO has pre-stored its public key (PKMNO) and a “personalised”
shared key (MSK) on the SE-SIM.
(3) The SE-SIM already has a personalised secret key (SKSE) and public key
(PKSE) stored securely in non-volatile memory.
(4) The mobile communication channel between the MNO/AuC and the cus-
tomer NFC phone is secure.
(5) The customer NFC phone has an external smart card reader (or cradle)
connected in order to communicate with the customer’s ID card (CDC).
(6) The MNO can obtain the public key of the CDC via a channel to the GCA.
Note that assumption (5) is only required for registration and would become
unnecessary if future CDC cards follow the market trend and also offer a
contactless interface.
The first step of endorsed registration is to forge a strong legal binding between
the “customer’s CDC” and “SE-SIM” cards. In order to achieve this we use
the customers’s CDC private key (SKCDC) to sign the public key of the SE
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(PKSE). An Endorsed Credential (EC) and a certificate of the SE (CerSE)
will be generated and utilised in the payment transaction phase. For further
detail on the binding generation processes between the CDC and the SE-SIM
please see the protocol step descriptions.
Steps 1 – 2: The customer first selects “registration” feature from the m-
payment application on his mobile phone, which prompts the user to insert
the CDC card into the reader (or bring in NFC range if contactless CDC).
Step 3: Here the ID number of the CDC card (IDCDC) is sent to the cus-
tomer’s phone.
Steps 4 – 5: The customer’s NFC phone makes an m-payment service request
to the MNO.
We assume there is a secure channel between the MNO and the customer
phone, using the identity and security credentials that are pre-stored in the SIM
and known by the MNO. Furthermore, the MNO has records of the phone’s
IDSE and associated PKSE. By sending the IDCDC to the MNO it is possible
for the MNO to check the validity of the CDC via the GCA and obtain the
associated public key (PKCDC).
Step 6: A random number, R1, is generated when the check of step 5 is suc-
cessful. The MNO produces a packet of information including PKCDC , IDSE,
PKSE, R1. A signature is added using the MNO’s private key (SKMNO). For
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the efficiency purpose, PKCDC is excluded from the signature so it can be used
as an encryption key by the user phone and the rest of the parameters can also
be put into use right away in step 8.
Steps 7 –8: After the pack of information is received, the NFC phone prompts
the user to enter a PIN for the purpose of user identification of the CDC card.
The SE-SIM then forwards a new pack of information to the CDC including
the original information IDSE, PKSE, R1, MNO’s signature in addition with
the PIN and another random number, R2, using the public key of CDC sent
from MNO and encrypted under it.
Step 9: The government issued ID card, CDC, decrypts the received packet
of information (PIN,R2, IDSE, PKSE, R1) from the MNO and SE-SIM. If
the PIN check fails then the phone may repeat step 8 allowing the customer
to try again. If the PIN try limit is reached (typically three attempts) then
the transaction terminates with an error message and customer guidance is
displayed via the phone. The significance is that the CDC card may no longer
be in possession of the legitimate holder.
If the PIN and signature are valid the CDC card increments both R1 and
R2, to reduce the risk of replay attack when the values are used again. An
Endorsed Credential (EC) is generated here, which is a binding of NFC phone
and CDC information (IDSE, CerCDC , PKSE), that is signed by the CDC.
IDSE and PKSE are the two critical components for identifying the SE-SIM.
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CerCDC and the signature of the CDC provide a proof that these components
are backed and guaranteed by a legitimate government issued ID card. EC =
IDSE, PKSE, CerCDC , SigSKCDC(IDSE, PKSE, CerCDC).
Steps 10 – 11: The random numbers R1 + 1 and R2 + 1 are used by the
MNO and SE-SIM respectively as tests of freshness. R1 + 1 and R2 + 1 are
encrypted by PKMNO and PKSE respectively to provide confidentiality. The
encrypted random values and the EC are sent to the NFC phone. Providing
R2 + 1, is correct, the EC is stored in the SE-SIM.
Steps 12 – 14: The encryption of R1 + 1 by PKMNO and the EC are for-
warded to the MNO for further authentication. The MNO can decrypt R1+1.
If the check on the returned R1+ 1 is correct, it implies that the correct CDC
card is being used for registration this is still true as the value of R1 is correct.
Furthermore, by checking the certificate of the CDC (CerCDC) via the GCA’s
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) the MNO can determine if the CDC is still
valid. After the check of CerCDC and EC, a new certificate is created for
subsequent use in m-payment transactions.
This certificate is called the certificate of EC i.e. (CerEC) and it includes extra
customer account information and payment details associated to this service,
such as the certificate’s serial number (SN), expiry date (ED), transaction
limits (TL) as well as PKSE, IDSE and IDCDC. All this information is signed
by the MNO’s private key (SKMNO).
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Step 15 – 16: Finally the certificate of EC is sent back to the NFC phone.
If the signature is correct the information is stored in the SE-SIM for use in
the m-payment transactions.
8.2.2 Phase 2: NFC m-Payment Transaction
Figure 8.3: NFC m-Payment with CDC – Payment Transaction Phase
Given a successful endorsed registration from the previous phase, the customer
phone/SIM is now ready to perform in-store m-payment transactions, in which
a customer tries to perform an in-store m-payment through the authentica-
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tion/verification of the MNO (that is endorsed by the CDC). On first entering
the payment application, the phone shall automatically display the expiry date
of certificate EC to the user, and payment actions will be restricted if CerEC
is out of date. The general payment process is that a customer presents his
phone close to the shop NFC POS, so the phone can present CerEC for an
ID authentication of its SE-SIM, and if the check passes then EC is sent in
addition with the payment information.
The MNO should already have EC and CerEC from the registration phase,
and a personalised/unique secret key (MSK) for the customer SE-SIM. There
is no secret key shared between the shop POS terminal and the customer SE-
SIM, thus the shop POS relies on the MNO to verify the authenticity of the
customer SE-SIM. The shop POS is able to verify the MNO signatures as it
has access to the public key of the MNO (PKMNO).
Steps 1 – 2: The shop NFC POS first scans barcodes/RFID tags of the
items to be purchased. The shop POS has a display of the total price of this
purchase. The customer holds his phone close to the shop POS as the preferred
method of payment and receives ordering information (OI) from the POS. The
information includes the order number (ON) and total price (TP ). A given
date/time of purchase is essential in any kind of payment transaction record.
Step 3: In this step there is a design option, as the user can be prompted for
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manual input e.g. a PIN, or alternatively the process could continue automat-
ically for a faster/smoother transaction. The manual check prevents misuse of
lost or stolen phones; whereas an automatic process can be faster and more
convenient for customers. By displaying total price, the customer can be sure
that the amount of money he would pay is correct. The SE-SIM then generates
a random number (R3) that is used in subsequent authentication.
Steps 4 – 5: The CerEC and R3 are encrypted under the personalised key
(MSK) between the MNO and the SE-SIM and sent along with the Mobile
Subscriber ISDN Number (MSISDN) (phone number) to the MNO, using the
POS as a simple pipe. Using IMSI instead of MSISDN for added privacy
is an option, however MSISDN is perhaps more relevant to customers i.e.
clearly indicates purchases made with the phone.
In any case, the account details can be linked to the IMSI or MSISDN by
the MNO, which means the MNO should know the SE-SIM’s identity and the
associated certificate created during endorsed registration. The MNO com-
pares the received CerEC with the registration version and checks for expiry
before continuing with the process.
Step 6: The incremented R3 is encrypted under MSK and sent back to the
customer SE-SIM, using the POS and phone as a simple pipe.
Steps 7 – 8: If the check of the incremented random number is correct, the SE-
SIM can confirm that it is dealing with messages from the genuine MNO. The
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SE-SIM then generates payment information, PI = OI, TS, SigSKSE(OI, TS).
The time stamp (TS) is embedded here to keep the freshness of the system.
The customer SE-SIM signs OI and TS, to prove that this binding data is
authorised and legally issued from the SE-SIM. In step 8, the PI and EC are
encrypted under MSK (to preserve privacy) and sent to the MNO.
Step 9: EC is checked first after the decryption of the binding data from step
8. The MNO uses PKSE from within EC for verifying the signature of the
SE-SIM on the payment information. At this stage, the MNO has confirmed
the identity of the customer and its signed PI. A check of time stamp (TS) is
necessary to ensure payment messages are sent within an expected time, and
a further check is made to ensure that the total price (TP ) does not exceed
the transaction limit (TL).
Steps 10 – 11: After the verification of PI, the money is deducted from the
customer’s account. The MNO creates a payment result PR for this transac-
tion. The PR includes the transaction number (TN), payment information
and date/time of completed transaction, plus the MNO signature.
Steps 12 – 14: The shop POS verifies the signature on PR using its pre-stored
MNO public key (PKMNO). It then checks for the correct payment amount
within OI. The POS then displays the transaction result on its screen and
prints an itemised billing receipt (on paper). The customer phone also receives
PR and then independently verifies and displays the transaction result. The
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same PR are expected to be shown on the shop POS and the customer phone
as the final step in the transaction.
8.3 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
8.3.1 Attack Scenarios
The protocol has been considered with respect to a number of attack scenarios
which are outlined in this section. Note that RP and PP are used to indicate
registration phase and payment phase respectively.
1. (RP) The customer could present a stolen CDC card during registration
however the user PIN challenge would prevent this from being useful.
An invalidated or expired CDC would also be detected by the MNO.
2. (RP) The use of the phone as a PIN entry device could create a vulner-
ability if the code could be tampered with, however the integrity of the
phone application could be secured via the cryptographic functionality
of the SIM card.
3. (RP) If the CDC to phone link could be eavesdropped during a normal
registration then an attacker may attempt to discover the CDC PIN from
the exchanged messages. Registration is intended to happen in a trusted
environment although this cannot be completely guaranteed and the like-
lihood of attack increases if the CDC evolves to a contactless interface.
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Therefore, the protocol protects the transmitted PIN via encryption with
(PKCDC).
4. (RP) A dishonest customer could take a copy of the legitimate EC and
CerEC and store in a second phone, however this should be of limited
use as the original phone’s SE (rather than that of the second phone) is
bound within the credentials.
5. (PP) A dishonest customer or shop-keeper might attempt to send cap-
tured transaction credentials to try and charge purchases to another
account, however the signature on new payment information will not be
correct and the timestamp will be invalid on an old payment signature.
6. (PP) During an m-payment transaction a customer or shop-keeper might
attempt to change the order information and correct payment, however
this information is checked visually as well as within the transaction
protocol.
7. (PP) It is unlikely that the MNO would attempt fraud due to the exist-
ing trust relationship with its customers; however customers would have
some protection as legitimate transactions are required to be associated
with signed payment information. This assumes that the SKSE only
exists within the SIM-SE.
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8.3.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of the CDC Mobile
Payment Scheme
In this section We weigh up some of the more general advantages and disad-
vantages of our proposed payment system.
Advantages: The benefits of the proposed protocol/system are listed below.
1. The customer NFC phone has an endorsed transaction credential (i.e.
EC) stored in the SE-SIM, which is backed by the strong registration
processes of the government ID card that has national recognition.
2. It is unnecessary for shops to be fitted with multiple proprietary MNO
systems as the proposed solution offers flexible multi-MNOs service to
customers.
3. Pre-storage of secret keys within the SE-SIM and the use of public key
infrastructure minimise key distribution worries, and customer signatures
ensure the authenticity and consent of purchase (i.e. non-repudiation).
4. Payment information (PI) is protected from being manipulated by the
shop POS.
5. Customers do not need to bring additional ID or payment cards as the
endorsed registration means that the handset can prove its authenticity
and also that of the customer (if the transaction PIN option is used).
6. In general the solution offers a more reliant and widely recognised user
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registration process for mobile phone access to services.
Disadvantages: As well as the advantages mentioned above, there are also
potential weaknesses that need further discussion.
1. With the current style of CDC card, an external contact smart card
reader or a cradle is needed during endorsed registration. This is likely
to limit registration to a trusted environment such as an MNO shop
or government office, although it is probable that a contactless CDC
interface will eventually be supported.
2. The payment process has been presented as on-line, although it is known
that there are arguments for off-line support [174]. The endorsed creden-
tials (which are at the core of the proposal) are considered equally valid
for off-line use although there would be greater reliance on the attack
resistance and integrity of the POS units. The credentials could also
be used in a different kind of on-line transaction in which the customer
scans his own purchases and transacts directly with the MNO over the
cellular network.
3. A customer’s MSISDN (phone number) is sent back in clear to the MNO
for customer identification via the shop POS during a payment transac-
tion. Although, phone numbers are not regarded as the most confidential
of information when compared to secret keys for example, there is still
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a privacy concern that phone numbers could be linked with customer
purchasing habits.
4. The speed and ease-of-use of a transaction system will determine whether
it is successful. The proposed solution requires a number of cryptographic
processes including PKI functions, which may stretch the capabilities of
limited resource devices such as security elements and mobile phones. A
detailed performance analysis is planned as follow-on work.
5. The protocol uses PKI key-pairs for both encryption and signing purpos-
es. Strictly speaking this does not follow best practice advice of using a
key-pair for one purpose only, however this is also true of other major
and widespread solutions such as credit card EMV chip and PIN trans-
actions. Further key-pairs could be added, although this may have a
practical impact on key storage and management.
6. We need modifications to CDC, since such a m-payment application is
not built into in the existing CDC card, which would require further gov-
ernment approval for installation on a government controlled platform.
8.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed the binding of NFC mobile phone security tech-
nologies with the user identity security of the CDC card that is backed by a
strong user registration process. The binding is achieved by an endorsed reg-
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istration phase that cryptographically binds the PKI credentials of the CDC
card and NFC phone in a way that is then nationally recognised.
The credentials can then be used for in-store payment transactions to provide
authentication, integrity and non repudiation, and without the user needing to
carry any payment or ID cards. The solution, which is applicable to multiple
MNOs, has a number of interesting features, although the feasibility of imple-
mentation and associated performance required investigation. The practical
work to investigate these issues is described in the following chapter.
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This chapter provides a simple proof-of-concept practical demonstration of the
CDC m-payment scheme in Chapter 8.
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9.1 Introduction
In Chapter 8, detailed descriptions of the protocols and architecture for the
proposed CDC m-payment scheme were provided. Recall that a goal of the
scheme is to exploit existing technologies such as a government PKI system, the
3G network and the NFC enabled contactless communication equipped within
the mobile handset. Several entities are involved in this scheme: the Mobile
Network Operator (MNO), the Governement Certificate Authority
(GCA), the shop Point-Of-Sale (POS) terminal, a user’s NFC-enable
handset, and user’s CDC card (eID card).
This m-payment scheme was designed to leverage from the eID card, which
is conventionally used for authentication purposes for citizens to interact with
government online services e.g. income tax filing. The government issued eID
card’s national recognition, legitimacy and the general-public trust are strong
advantages that can be used in a wider range of services. The use of the GPKI
endorsed eID card in cooperation with the handset concept can be utilised
on diverse applications, although in this thesis, a m-payment scheme is taken
as an example to show advantages of the combination of the NFC-enabled
handset and the CDC card.
In proposing any new protocol, and especially one that directly interacts with
the user it is necessary to show that that it is feasible to implement using
realistic technology and that the performance will be sufficient. Therefore
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a proof-of-concept implementation is presented in this chapter. The imple-
mentation and particularly the public key cryptographical calculations on the
resource limited device (i.e. the handset) within a user acceptable time has
been demonstrated as feasible.
9.2 System Overview
In the prototype implementation the main focus was on the interaction between
the MNO and the user’s handset (in the registration phase) and the shop POS
terminal and the user’s handset (in the payment phase). All backend processes
for the user phone to be between the POS and the MNO were considered to
be true/succesful. Two Nokia6131 NFC handsets were used, one acted as the
user’s handset, and the other emulated the POS. The whole payment scheme
consists of two phases: the “registration phase” and the “payment phase” as
shown in Figures 9.1 and 9.2.
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Figure 9.1: Implementation - Registration Phase
Figure 9.2: Implementation - Payment Phase
* Please note that the card and reader modes of ISO14443 standard are used
in the registration phase; and the P2P mode of the standard ISO18092 is used
in the payment phase.
9.3 Platform and Tools
The system development tools used are listed below:
– Eclipse SDK 3.4.2 win32 Ganymede
– SUN JAVA wireless toolkit 2.5.2
– Nokia 6131 NFC SDK 1.1
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– JDK 6u25 windows i586
– NXP JCOP Plugins Generic3.2.8 Target1.2.9
• The Java phone applications MIDlets were developed using the Eclipse
Integrated Development Environment (IDE).
• The SUN JAVA wireless toolkit provided the important “Security and
Trust Services API (SATSA)(JSR 177) for J2ME ”
• the Nokia 6131 Software Development Kit (SDK) provided “contactless
communication API (JSR-257) and contactless communication API Ex-
tensions for NFC”.
• The NXP JCOP Plugins were used for development of Java smartcard
applications (Applets).
9.4 Nokia 6131
The demonstration handset used for this scheme was the Nokia 6131, which
was a Nokia S40 phone with NFC support. A Nokia 6131 has an embedded
Secure Element (SE). Its architecture is shown in Figure 9.4.
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Figure 9.3: Nokia 6131 NFC handset.
Figure 9.4: Nokia 6131 NFC architecture. [167]
The Nokia 6131 NFC device provides the following card emulations / target
modes:
– ISO 14443-4A/ISO7816-4 Smart Card (Global Platform-based Java Smart
Card)
– Mifare Standard 4k
– NFCIP-1 Target
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The target types values supported by JSR-257[170] implemented in Nokia 6131:
– TargetType.ISO14443 CARD for ISO 14443-4 compliant smart cards ac-
cessed using APDU commands.
– TargetType.NDEF TAG for a tag that contains NFC Forum formatted data.
– TargetType.RFID TAG for general RFID tags.
The SE in Nokia6131 consists of a chip with a Java Card area and Mifare 4K
area (which also behaves as Mifare 1k) for tag emulation. With respect to
Java applications the memory size of the SE is approximately 65 kbytes. The
overall memory size is 72kbytes, however some space is required for product
specific applications and the Mifare 4k area. The JSR 257 also provides an
API extension for NFC peer to peer connections. The com.nokia.nfc.p2p pack-
age contains the NFCIPConnection interface for communication between two
NFCIP devices. [169]
The possible external passive tags by a Nokia 6131 for reading and writing
include: [169]
– MIFARE STANDARD 1K and 4K
– MIFARE Ultralight
– MIFARE Desfire
– Sony FeliCa
– Innovision Topaz and Jewel (read only)
– Cards based on ISO 14443-4 (with or without ISO 7816-4)
– NFCIP-1 Initiator
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For the practical implementation of the m-payment system , the ISO 14443-4
standard was selected.
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9.5 Practical Implementation
The proposed protocol relies on a number of cryptographic primitives. These
included an RSA public key encryption and signature scheme with 1024 bits
key, the SHA-1 hash function, a 3DES based Message Authentication function
plus associated credentials such as X.509 certificates.
*Note that in the real practice the CDC card uses an RSA 2048 bits keys.
Note that it is recognised that to comply with best-practice today on would
suggest a 2048 bit RSA key and a SHA-256, however this was thought be-
yond the capabilities of early resource constrained NFC devices. Considering
that a design goal was to make best usage of existing technologies, evaluation
with the older primitives was thought justified at the time of the experiments.
Newer NFC phones would be expected to have better performance, sufficient
to comply with information security best practices.
Before a citizen can make use of the m-payment protocol it is necessary to go
through a registration phase in which the citizens CDC credentials and mobile
credentials are securely bound together.
9.5.1 Registration Phase
Before a citizen can make use of the m-payment protocol it is necessary to go
through a registration phase in which the citizens CDC credentials and mobile
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credentials are securely bound together.
Figure 9.5: User action and phone display in registration phase.
Figure 9.5 presents the essential user action and the expected screen display
on the user’s handset when performing the registration. Note that the Nat-
ural Person Card (NPC) and the Citizen Digital Certificate (CDC) represent
the same thing, the NPC is a term used by the general-public, whereas the
CDC represents this in a more technical manner. Thus, on the phone display
the NPC term was used, and the term, CDC, is used in most descriptions
throughout this thesis. The implementation of this function would follow the
steps shown in Figure 9.5.
Figure 9.6: Application home page.
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Figure 9.7: Function selection page.
In the design of this m-payment scheme, a service registration process is re-
quired in order to bind the user’s identity, and the CDC card, to the user’s
SIM for the consequent purchasing action. Figure 9.6 is the welcome page for
the phone application (Midlet prompting the user to choose one of the two
functions in the display of Figure 9.7: “Save NPC1” and “Transaction”). In
this registration phase, the first function is selected to save certificate endorsed
by the user’s own CDC/NPC card.
Please note that to simplify the implementation on the GUI display that most
of the commands would need to be opened/found by pressing the “options”
button bottom left of the screen.
1Natural Person Certificate
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Figure 9.8: Sign SE page.
SE public key: 52bc5abeff8a6518d94d03ce57e7bfe12e69a0c8
Since an assumption of “all return messages are true/successful from the MNO
to the user phone” was made for experiments, the return values and informa-
tion from the MNO were pre-stored in the internal SE of the handset. Figure
9.8 shows the public key of the SE that was saved in the handset already and
ready to be sent/signed by the CDC card once the user has confirmed the
action.
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Figure 9.9: User’s PIN input page.
User’s PIN is required here to activate the endorsed signing process.
(a) (b)
Figure 9.10: CDC card interact with user’s handset page
Figure 9.10a indicates the handset is ready and waiting to interact with the
CDC card. The user just needs to put the CDC card and the phone next to
each other to start the signing process. Bear in mind that the reader/writer ca-
pability of Nokia 6131 flip-phone is enabled only when the handset is open and
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the backlight is on, since the antenna is built on the top part of the flip cover
of the phone that is where to touch/interact with the external devices/tokens
(as shown in Figure 9.10b).
Figure 9.11: Save in memory card page.
Since the processes between the MNO and the shop POS are not part of the
experiment at this stage, step12 to step15 of the protocol stated in Chapter
8 are skipped in this practical design. Therefore, for the simplicity of im-
plementation, the certificate is replaced by the Endorsed Credential (EC) (a
credential signed by the CDC card) in this design.
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Figure 9.12: Saving certificate page.
return certificate: 24ba67db0b162dcccf1cbdee1bb217d78169fc1f
A return certificate (it is actually the EC) is displayed on the screen to prove
the success of the signature signing. “Save complete” message is shown to
state the certificate is successfully saved in the memory card. The total exec-
utive time for the signature signing is 1430 milliseconds and the total
executive time for the this function, including the waiting time for user
to put the phone and the CDC card close to each other, is 46 seconds.
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Figure 9.13: Certificate existed exception page.
exception: already exists
Figure 9.13 shows an error message displays if a certificate has already existed
in the phone. Basically only one certificate is needed to execute the payment
transactions which is explained in the next phase.
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9.5.2 Payment Transaction Phase
Figure 9.14: User manual and phone display in payment phase.
In Figure 9.14 displays the flow for the user to execute the payment transaction
function after the successful installation of the certificate in the registration
phase. Basically user would hold user’s phone to touch with what they want
to purchase first then head to the POS phone to check out.
(a) (b)
Figure 9.15: (a) Application home page. (b) Function selection page.
The payment function has to be selected from the application home page.
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(a) (b)
Figure 9.16: (a) Product tags reading page. (b) Product information display
page.
After the selection of the “transaction”, the user is allowed to use the phone
to interact/touch the tag on each product to extract the information such as
the name, cost, product code and etc.
Figure 9.17: User’s PIN input page.
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Again, the input of the user password is required to confirm the purchase
action and to prevent misuse and eavesdropping attacks.
Figure 9.18: (Left): POS phone, ready to interact with the user’s phone for
payment. (Right): User’s phone, ready to check out.
Figure 9.19: Interaction between POS phone and user’s phone for payment
transaction.
Figure 9.18 presents the state for both the POS phone and the user phone
before the payment transaction interaction (via NFC peer-to-peer mode) be-
tween each other. Figure 9.19 shows how both phones interact with each other
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at the flip cover of the Nokia 6131 phone.
(a) (b)
Figure 9.20: (a) POS phone transaction complete page. (b) User’s phone
transaction success page.
The transaction result are shown on both of the phones in Figure 9.20. The
display of the certificate value in Figure 9.20a is equivalent to the original
certificate in Figure 9.12, which means the POS phone successfully verified,
by the user’s/SE’s public key, the received data sent from the user phone. In
total, the POS phone retrieved the certificate and the product information for
check-out. The received certificate was originally signed by the user’s/SE’s
private key, and sent to POS phone for authentication and identification for
the payment service.
After the certificate check and the money deduction from the user’s account
within the MNO (assuming they are all successfully done and returned with
a transaction result), the transaction result would be displayed on both the
POS phone and user phone to inform the completion of the transaction.
On the screen display in Figure 9.20b 133 seconds was shown that indicates
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the total time span used for the payment transaction, including the waiting
time for the user phone to touch the POS phone.
9.6 Evaluation
Figure 9.21: Certificate Signing Runtime.
Figure 9.22: Total execution time of the application display page.
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Figure 9.21 and 9.22 present time spans for the customer to carry out both
registration and payment processes in a timely manner. The main goal of this
simple demo is to show the execution time of payment procedures is likely to
be acceptable to customers.
Please note that a proprietary PKI card was used; and hardware cryptograph-
ic calculations were offered by the PKI card and the SE. In the beginning
RSA2048 was used/implemented, but the Nokia6131 SE was unable to inter-
act with the PKI card generating RSA1024 signature.
A website offering JavaCard’s algorithms and supporting tests on Nokia 6131
NFC phones [171], indicates the Nokia6131 SE does not support RSA2048
signature (this meets the result as mentioned earlier). Moreover, for message
digest algorithms only SHA1, MD5 and RIPEMD160 are supported.
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Figure 9.23: Stats of time span in registration and payment procedures
In Figure 9.23 a table of Statistics with running 20 times for each registration
and payment procedures. The average time for forming a signature is 1501.8
milliseconds; and for completing the registration procedure takes around 6.35
seconds. A line chart regarding to the RSA1024 signature running 20 times is
displayed in Figure 9.24.
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Figure 9.24: Statistics of performing RSA1024 Signature x20
Figure 9.25: Statistics of performing registration and payment procedures x20
Apart from generating the signature, other steps like retrieving the SE public
key, selecting file, inputting PIN and generating/saving a hashed credential
(acts as a certificate in the protocol) used up the time for registration.
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The time spent for the payment procedure is almost double of it takes during
the registration. Its average time span is 12 seconds (including the user con-
trol). This includes the time of retrieving the certificate, encryption/decryption
of the binding credential sent to the POS.
In conclusion, the Nokia6131 provided a constrained resource NFC mobile
environment, an SE capable of supporting limited, but usable cryptographi-
cal algorithms. The major information required for this payment application
was secured by RSA1024 signature and encryption/decryption payloads were
smaller than 1Kbyte, resulting in tolerable an overall runtimes for the each
registration and payment phases. Considering that more modern NFC mo-
bile devices have greater performance than the Nokia 6131, both the speed
of transactions and strength of cryptographic functions may be considerably
improved, suggesting that the proposed protocols are practically feasible.
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10.1 Conclusion
A major goal of the research described in this thesis was to investigate the
practical and secure use of short-range NFC technology in conjunction with
existing and well proven long-range wireless technologies, and in particular
GSM and 3G cellular systems with their well proven security solutions. A
guiding principle was to maximise the re-use of legacy wireless systems in
combination with the newer NFC technology to provide a practical route and
options, for improved user experience and efficiency, and yet offering strong
security protection. In short, complementary advantages from each technology
generated a solution with strength that was more than the sum of its parts.
This thesis records the progression of the research and how the associated
legacy systems considered for use with NFC started with GSM then moved
to 3G and finally incorporated a citizen ID card systems and associated. PKI
infrastructure. These were also clear stages that were associated with confer-
ence publications [173][174][175]. They described how the core system security
mechanisms migrated from symmetric only to also include asymmetric crypto-
graphical security protection and the underlying algorithms, key lengths and
protocols offered by legacy systems also improved Tradeoffs in algorithm com-
plexity, key and data size, processing speed and usability are important for the
success of the system and further improvements are expected as smartphone
capabilities continue to advance.
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However, by focusing on technology alone there is a danger that a closed and
proprietary system results that is not accepted or trusted by third parties.
The initial stages of the research focused on solutions that were completely
MNO centric, but it was recognized that an independent trust hierarchy with
strong user registration procedures would complement the MNO approach,
permitting more significant and trusted transactions. As a result the final
stage of the research combined the government CDC credential with the NFC
and MNO solution.
In summary the resulting m-payment schemes proposed in this thesis have
achieved all met their essential security requirements such as providing: user
authentication, privacy, key management, data integrity and confidentiality,
and digital signatures / non-repudiation (for the CDC scheme especially). The
proposed solutions are not equally strong, however that is to be expected when
re-using legacy systems and technology, with the minimum of disruption to the
user.
In the final proposals the combination of PKI trust hierarchy, cryptography,
anddigital signatures with NFC technology can protect high value transactions
within a secure mobile communication environment, and so may handle ap-
plications that require higher security levels. Core to this was the PKI-based
credential binding concept using the Secure Element (SE) to keep the user’s
unique private key for the consent of user action and data protection.
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Although the research, kept to the goal of re-using technology and function-
ality as much as possible, any new protocol will have some changes and so it
is reasonable to question the performance impact of the proposal. Therefore
within the research we have evaluated the performance of the implementation
by measuring the processing time, the code size and the size of the produced
signature records. The result has shown that it is possible to process sig-
natures and certificates in mobile devices and that signature records can be
put on the SE and that overall the user would not be significantly delayed or
inconvenienced.
A conventional PKI system requires a responsible party to be responsible for
managing certificates.
The proposed government endorsed m-payment scheme is Mobile Network Op-
erator (MNO) centric, which means the certificate management jobs such as
certificate registration , certificate/identity verification, Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) update and etc. can be apportioned to the mature MNO infras-
tructure. A potential drawback of such as system is that the MNO may not be
universally trusted making transactions difficult for parties on different netw
orks. In our proposed scheme, users are allowed to enjoy convenient cross-
network
NFC services without back office barriers at the backend for the MNOs. This
is possible because of the inclusion of an existing and nationally recognised
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trust mechanism via the national CDC credential. The associate transaction-
s would have a strong binding to the user identity (established by rigorous
national registration processes) and so applications of high significance could
be supported. The NFC phone could become the preferred identity credential
and/or terminal as people may prefer to keep the real national ID card (as the
master reference) and use the rich phone functionality instead. In which case
MNOs may gain valuable insight into user behaviour when engaged in a wider
variatey of transactions.
The success of such a proposal is of course dependent not only on security,
but of the user experience, of the entire transaction. Some experiments, relat-
ing to an m-payment transaction were conducted, to investigate this aspect.
Encouragingly, in a practical demonstration, it was shown the total time for
completing a payment transaction was within an acceptable time frame for use
by the general public.
The practical binding of NFC mobile capabilities with strong user identity
could lead to many possible applications. For example an unbound phone/user
may have very restricted payment limits, whereas the ID bound mobile could
have much greater purchasing power. It might also be used in an identification
area, for example an alcohol/cigarettes vending machine might verify the age
of the user as part of the payment process.There are also applications to iden-
tification and payment in roaming scenarios. For example a foreigner can bind
part of their ID information with the local MNO/SIM, and be accepted to use
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value added the local mobile contactless services and to get special offers and
discounts (advertising, sightseeing and shopping recommendations) or perhaps
to execute money transfers.
There are many ways this research could be taken further in future, however
two in particular will be noted here, as they would have been investigated fur-
ther had more time been available. The first proposal still relates to m-payment
via NFC phone; however it expands into the wider shopping experience. In
the not-too-distant future it is reasonable to predict that items in shops and
supermarkets will be RFID tagged and that the radio aspects of NFC technol-
ogy will evolve to be compatible with all such tags. Therefore the proposed
solution could be extended to “shopping” by scanning the required items prior
to adding to the shopping bag. On leaving the shop the phone (either auto-
matically or by touching a checkout tag) would calculate and make payment.
Because of the strong ID binding payments of several £100s could be made
and should fraud be suspected the strong binding with the end user could be
used to identify the user and take appropriate action.
The second proposal is to use ICAO compatible passports with RFID chips
as an alternative to the CDC card. Experiments have shown some practi-
cal aspects of this to be feasible and it could lead to a more internationally
recognized solution than the CDC card.
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The following clarifications were provided on the draft version of the thesis and
are included here at the request of the examiners.
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11.1 Additional Information on the 2G Protocol
The 2G protocol was a stepping stone towards the 3G version. It is inferior to
the 3G version and has a number of security limitations arising from practical
restrictions and re-use; putting more reliance on the phone. It is included to
show the motivation and progression towards improved solutions.
Implementation Assumptions:
• The phone can support custom applications in the form of Java MidLets.
• The Midlets have access to a basic Crypto API.
• The phone can only be temporarily trusted with session keys for encryp-
tion/decryption and integrity checking.
• Existing SIM application crypto functions are used for authentication
and key generation; the functions can be slightly modified, but no extra
crypto functions added
• Normal communications should be disabled during a transaction
11.1.1 Encryption/Decryption and Integrity Checks
The simplest phone Midlet API supported a DES/3DES block cipher/MAC,
and hash functions, SHA-1 and MD5. For this protocol DES/3DES encryp-
tion/MAC and SHA-1 were selected. It was recognised that these would no
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longer comply with best-practice recommendations, however Kc (used in the
protocol) has a maximum of only 64 bits and some older implementations use
only 54 of these bits. The 2G communications algorithms were not available
via the phone APIs and the encryption/decryption is thought likely to be a
hardware implementation dedicated to radio communications purposes. Kc
and S are not used for their traditional purposes, so normal communication is
disrupted by a transaction.
In steps 10 to 11 of Fig 6.1 a DES/3DES CBC-MAC is used to check that
the random challenge originated from a valid source, and Kc is used. A DES
CBC-MAC only uses 56 key bits whereas the Kc could have up to 64 bits
and so an alternative approach is to expand the key and used it in a 2-key
3DES mode; however the improvement is marginal as 64 bits is still “small”
by best-practice guidelines.
The key (Kc1) that is derived from SHA-1 takes the LSBs of the hash output
(recognising that the entropy of the output key is no better than that of the
input). Encryption/decryption between the entities (steps 15.1 through 22) is
based on DES (but 2-key 3DES is possible as mentioned earlier). Where the
message size is larger than 64 bits the encryption/decryption algorithms are
used in CBC mode.
The Payment Information (PI) message is subsequently encrypted (to prevent
eavesdropping) between the phone and the POS/Gateway using Kc1. The
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message includes an integrity check value computed over the fixed length mes-
sage (PI, S, IMSI) for use by the gateway; the SIM has no MAC capability
and so the calculation has to be done in the phone. DES (or 2-key 3DES) CBC-
MAC is used. which is equivalent to a fixed message encryption, however the
correct terminology is MACKc(PI, S, IMSI) and not EKc(PI, S, IMSI).
There is also an application level check performed at the POS for the benefit of
the Merchant/Cashier to be sure the correct order and value is being processes.
There is a finalMACKp on the message sent at step 26 of Fig 6.1 for verification
by the POS/shop. Note that Kp does not have the size restrictions of Kc so
could be made larger; although the system is only as strong as the weakest
link.
11.2 Additional Information on the 3G Protocol
Implementation Assumptions:
• The phone can support custom applications in the form of Java MidLets.
• The Midlets have access to a basic Crypto API.
• The phone can only be temporarily trusted with session keys for encryp-
tion/decryption.
• Existing SIM application crypto functions are used for authentication,
key generation and integrity checks; the functions can be slightly modi-
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fied, but no extra crypto functions added.
• Normal communications should not be blocked during a transaction.
11.2.1 Encryption/Decryption, Verification and Integrity Check-
ing
The available 3G phone Midlet API supported block ciphers 3DES and AES
(which can also be used for CBC MACs). AES with a 128 bit key is recom-
mended for phone/POS/gateway encryption/decryption, based on its security
strength and convenient 128 bit block size. 3DES is also possible, but there
are only enough key bits (easily obtainable from the SIM) to operate it in two
key mode, which would be below best practice standards. The 3G communi-
cations algorithms were not available via the phone APIs and the encryption is
thought likely to be a hardware implementation which should not be disrupted
from its normal communications use.
The key used is IK1 which is generated by a call to the SIM’s f4 function via
the new SIM command “CRYP” (see definition below). Note that this extra
key is only necessary because we want the phone to be able to communicate
during a transactions so do not wish to re-use the CK or IK values.
The Payment Information (PI) is subsequently encrypted between the phone
and the POS/Gateway.
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11.2.2 Verification and Integrity Checking
At step 22 in Fig 7.1 the checking is done at the application level and visible
to the merchant - basically checking that the Order Information (OI) is as
expected. The message does require a SIM generated integrity check for use
at step 24 (by the gateway). This was a challenge as the SIM is not normally
used for general purpose message integrity check calculation (or verification).
The f4 function was chosen initially as it was accessible i.e. its output normally
leaves the SIM as a result field and because it would have to be modified anyway
to support the CRYP command. Its use was considered not to reveal the input
key field, however its quality as a MAC function is unknown as it is intended
for key generation.
The SIM does however include a function (f1) that should have suitable MAC
properties as it was designed for MAC computation as part of the authenti-
cation process, although the f1 output does not normally leave the SIM as a
result/output. Providing the f1 output is visible to the SIM application (and
not hidden in low-level hardware/OS) then modifying the access to f1 as well
as f4 (or indeed f2, 3 and 5) is not thought difficult, and the same CRYP
command could be used with different parameters.
Therefore the protocol in Figure 7.1 could benefit from using f1 instead of f4
from steps 21 onwards and so the descriptive text on pages 141 to 143 and the
analysis text on page 145 should be updated. Of course it would be possible
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to implement any new algorithm in place of the current functions, but that
would go against the goal of re-use and could require significant added testing
and evaluation.
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11.2.3 CRYP COMMAND
CRYP COMMAND
COMMAND CLASS INS P1 p2 P3
CRYP 0x00 0x8F FSELECT FMode FLENGTH
Valid Parameter Combinations
Response data
FSELECT Bytes(s) Description Length
0x01 0x00 - 0x07 Output (normally MAC) 0x08
0x04 0x00 - 0x0F Output (normally key) 0x10
Mode Usage: Mode 0x00 used at step 12 and 21 of Fig 7.1; Mode 0x01 used
at step 29.2
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11.3 Additional Information on the CDC Protocol
The PKI algorithm in CDC is RSA and so that is used for the protocol. The
CDC key size is 2048 bits which again is the protocol recommendation, however
the phone used for practical work could only support 1024 bits and so there
was a compromise for testing.
In the registration phase, RSA is used for encryption/decryption (with suitable
padding). In the transaction phase AES is used with the 128 bit MSK, partly
because it is faster than RSA.
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